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Abstract: With the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights in 2013, a growing bulk of literature is focusing on how, not whether, 
socioeconomic rights should be enforced. A largely unresolved question in this regard, is how the 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights should purport to adjudicate individual complaints 
involving retrogressive measures, defined by scholars as backwards steps in the level of protection 
accorded to the Covenant rights as a consequence of an intentional decision by a State Party. The question 
is particularly relevant since, in contrast to the other complaint mechanisms of the United Nations human 
rights treaty system, the Optional Protocol contains an express standard of review – the ‘reasonableness 
review’ – as provided by article 8 (4). 
 
Among the challenges relating to the adjudication of retrogression-related complaints, is the unclear 
relationship between retrogressive measures on the one hand and formal limitations on the other. Indeed, 
while the Covenant contains a general limitations clause as set in article 4, the Committee has developed 
a doctrine on non-retrogression, in the light of which most active state interferences are reviewed. The 
doctrine is understood to mirror the concept of progressive realization contained in article 2 (1), since, by 
undertaking to progressively realize the Covenant rights, states simultaneously undertake not to reduce 
already achieved levels of access to them. 
 
After having sought to clarify the normative content of the concept of non-retrogression, the thesis draws 
attention to the judicial enforcement of retrogression-related complaints. In the light of considerations of 
distributive justice, it is argued that the concept of non-retrogression should not be interpreted and applied 
in an excessively rigorous manner. This, particularly since a rigorous enforcement of the concept might 
obstruct the possibilities by states to redistribute resources to marginalized groups of society. 
 
The thesis is concluded with three main findings. First, that because retrogressive measures in terms of 
article 2(1) and limitations in terms of article 4 share significant similarities, they should not be treated 
differently, but instead reviewed under a single standard set by the general limitations clause. Second, that 
the concept of non-retrogression, designed for the purpose of monitoring result-based realization over the 
population as a whole, should not be applied in the context of individual contentious processes. And 
finally, that a standard of ‘reasonableness-inflected proportionality’, by reflecting the respective strengths 
of reasonableness and proportionality, might provide the answer for a socially just adjudication of active 
retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
On 5 May 2013 – nearly four decades after the entry into force of its civil and political 
counterpart – the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR or the Optional Protocol) entered into force.1 As such, 
it finally allowed the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or the 
Committee) to consider complaints by individuals and groups of alleged violations of the 
economic, social and cultural (socioeconomic) rights recognized by the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR or the Covenant).2 Ending 
the historic imbalance in the international protection of civil and political rights on the 
one hand, and socioeconomic rights on the other, the entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol thus reinforced the understanding of human rights as truly “universal, indivisible 
and interdependent”.3 Against this background, the important question is no longer 
whether, but how, socioeconomic rights should be enforced.4 
 
While the Committee has sought to clarify the content of the majority of the obligations 
flowing from the Covenant rights, only little attention has been paid towards the question 
of legitimate limitations. It is for instance notable that although the ICESCR contains a 
general limitations clause as set forth in article 4, it is rarely applied in practice. Rather, 
the Committee seems to have developed a doctrine on non-retrogression, understood as 
the “natural corollary” to the concept of progressive realization as contained in article 2 
(1) of the Covenant.5 According to that provision, each State Party “undertakes to take 
steps…to the maximum of its resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”. 
The concept of non-retrogression thus follows from the understanding that State Parties, 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
ICESCR-OP), 10 December 2008, UN doc. A/RES/63/117. 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR), 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
3Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, 25 
June 1993, UN doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 5. 
4South African Constitutional Court, Grootboom and Others v. The Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others (2000) (hereinafter Grootboom), judgement of 4 May 2000, CCT 11/00, para. 20. 
5 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (hereinafter Nolan et. al.), 2014, p. 123. 
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by undertaking to progressively realize the Covenant rights, simultaneously undertake 
not to reduce already achieved levels of access to them.6 
 
Despite the central role of the concept of non-retrogression, it suffers from a lack of a 
clear normative content to guide its interpretation and application. Most notably, the 
Committee has refrained from addressing a number of crucial questions such as the actual 
meaning of ‘retrogressive measures’; the precise circumstances under which such 
measures may be considered justifiable; whether compliance should be measured in light 
of a particular individual or groups of individuals, or in light of the population as a whole; 
as well as the relationship, if any, between retrogressive measures and limitations in terms 
of the general limitations clause. Such ambiguity is reflected, for instance, by the varying 
reference to it by scholars as both a ‘prohibition’,7 ‘principle’,8 and an ‘escape-hatch’9. 
Arguably, therefore, the nebulous scope of the concept poses a challenge for the 
adjudication of retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
 
While it is suggested by many scholars that the main purpose of socioeconomic rights is 
to transform societies into being more socially just,10 particularly in developing countries 
by facilitating the access to rights by poorest members of society,11 increasing evidence 
points towards a gap between theory and practice; instead of focusing exclusively or even 
primarily on the marginalized, the main beneficiaries of the enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights belong to middle- or higher income groups of society.12 One 
explanation to the above may lie with an overly rigorous application of the concept of 
non-retrogression. Indeed, by “locking in” already achieved levels of access to rights by 
particular individuals or groups, it might risk obstructing governments’ broader aims of 
achieving a more equitable distribution of resources.13 With this in mind, a question of 
 
 
 
6 This is implied by the fact that the concept of non-retrogression was introduced in conjunction with the 
concept of progressive realization, see UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations, 14 December 
1990, E/1991/23, para. 9. 
7 See e.g., Nolan et. al., 2014, Kirvesniemi. 2015. 
8 See e.g. Warwick, 2016, p. 254, Landau, 2012, p. 220. 
9 Wills & Warwick, 2016, p. 10. 
10 Much of the scholarship on the transformative purpose of socioeconomic rights, particularly in the 
South African context, is based on the work of Karl E Klare. See further, chapter 4.4.1. 
11 Landau & Dixon, 2019, p. 110. 
12 Ibid., p. 111. 
13 See e.g., Landau, 2012, pp. 231-235. 
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particular importance is whether the concepts of progressivity/non-retrogression – 
designed originally for monitoring purposes in the context of state reporting processes – 
are appropriate yardsticks when adjudicating complaints under the Optional Protocol.14 
 
In finding a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the population as a 
whole, the choice of review standard applied by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies when 
assessing alleged violations may play a pivotal role. The question of how the Committee 
applies such standards in a given case, particularly in relation to retrogression-related 
complaints, is, however, largely unresolved. In this context, two standards of review are 
of particular interest: first, a standard based on proportionality, often referred to as the 
‘proportionality analysis’,15 and second, a standard based on reasonableness, in turn 
known as the ‘reasonableness review’.16 Importantly, the latter is provided by article 8 
(4) of the Optional Protocol, thereby constituting the first complaint mechanism of a core 
human rights treaty to provide for an express standard of review for the assessment of 
alleged violations.17  In accordance with said provision, the Committee is mandated to 
consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by State Parties – both forwards and back. 
 
 
There are nevertheless reasons to examine the question further. In general terms, namely, 
the choice of review follows certain underlying factors, inter alia, the nature of the 
relevant obligation under assessment.18 Hence, whereas the reasonableness review is 
applied mainly in relation to alleged violations by states involving a failure to adopt active 
measures in order to protect and fulfil the relevant rights, in contrast, the proportionality 
analysis is applied mainly in relation to alleged infringements by the state to respect the 
rights in question. While socioeconomic rights admittedly give rise to the obligations of 
protect and fulfil more frequently than their civil and political counterparts, in terms of 
the ICESCR, however, the concept of non-retrogression shares notable similarities with 
the obligation  to  respect.19   It is  therefore unclear  whether  the two  concepts  –  the 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Melish, 2005, pp. 60-64. 
15 See generally e.g., Alexy, 2002, Möller, 2012. 
16 See generally e.g. Liebenberg, 2010, Young, 2017. 
17 Griffey, 2011, p. 277. 
18 See e.g., Liebenberg 2010, pp. 54, 218, Young 2010, p. 413. 
19 O’Connell, Nolan, Harvey, Dutschke and Rooney (hereinafter O’Connell et al), 2014, p. 92. 
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obligation not to take retrogressive measures, and the obligation to respect – might in fact 
be viewed as commensurate and thus reviewed under a unified approach. 
 
 
It is furthermore noteworthy that regardless of their differing methodologies, both the 
proportionality analysis and the reasonableness review involve considerations of weight 
and balance. Indeed, while the structured test of proportionality does not appear to have 
found its way into the enforcement of socioeconomic rights, proportionality as a principle 
is understood as an integral part of reasonableness.20 A logical consequence of the above 
is their rejection of more absolutist standards, in particular the minimum core.21 Important 
questions nevertheless remain as to the relationship between proportionality and 
reasonableness, particularly in the context of adjudicating retrogression-related 
complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
 
 
1.2. Research questions and structure 
 
In light of the above, the purpose of the present thesis is to examine how the Committee 
should purport to adjudicate complaints involving retrogressive measures under the 
Optional Protocol. The topic will be examined in light of two main research questions: 
 
 
1)  What is  the content and  scope of the  concept  of non-retrogression?  In 
particular, what are the criteria against which compliance is measured? 
 
 
2)  What  standard  of  review  should  the  Committee  apply  when  assessing 
retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol? 
 
 
Although the latter question is undoubtedly the main focus of this thesis, it cannot be 
answered without first having examined the former. It is thus necessary to begin by 
examining the legal nature of socioeconomic rights in general, and the concept of non- 
retrogression in particular, before addressing how the Committee might assess 
retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. In considering the latter 
question, I will examine three sub-questions: first, whether retrogressive measures and 
 
 
20 Young, 2017, p. 13. 
21 See e.g. Young, 2008, pp. 140, 169. 
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limitations may be considered as commensurate, and thus reviewed under a unified 
standard. Second, whether the concepts of progressivity/non-retrogression may 
automatically be transferred from state reporting processes to the individual 
communications procedure. And third, whether, and if so how, the Committee should 
purport to reconcile the standards of reasonableness and proportionality when 
adjudicating retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
 
 
The thesis is divided into five main chapters. After this introduction, in chapter two, I will 
examine the state obligations flowing from the general obligations provisions of the 
ICESCR, particularly articles 2 (1) and 4. This will provide the reader with a general 
background on socioeconomic rights law, upon which later parts of the thesis build. 
Having considered some of the reasons behind the Committee’s apparent difficulties in 
defining the content and scope of the concept of non-retrogression, chapter three is 
continued by considering how the Committee has sought to develop the concept in more 
detail. In particular, I will examine when retrogressive measures may be considered 
justifiable. Finally, it is examined whether compliance should be measured in light of a 
particular individual or group of individuals, or in relation to the population as a whole. 
 
 
Whereas the aim of the first two substantive chapters is to clarify the nature of the state 
obligations flowing from the Covenant, the final two chapters are devoted to questions 
relating to their adjudication. Accordingly, in chapter four, I will examine questions 
relating to court postures, standards of review and distributive justice. The applicable 
standards of review will furthermore be examined and juxtaposed. Against the 
background of the potentials and pitfalls of the relevant standards, in the final chapter of 
this thesis, I will examine how the Committee should approach individual complaints 
involving retrogressive measures. The chapter is divided into three subchapters, in which 
the three sub-questions as presented above (concerning question two), are examined 
respectively. Finally, in light of the purportedly transformative purpose of socioeconomic 
rights enforcement, I attempt to determine a new, hybrid standard of review to guide the 
Committee in adjudicating retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
6  
 
1.3. Material and method 
 
I aim to answer the research questions by way of examining the sources of international 
law, as set forth by article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.22 It 
lists the following sources: 
 
 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
 
d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the provisions of the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR are of 
particular interest. These are especially articles 2 (1) and 4 of the ICESCR, and article 8 
(4) of the Optional Protocol. Said provisions will be examined in light of the general rules 
of interpretation, as provided by article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).23 Particular focus will be given to the practice of the CESCR; the 
international body of 18 experts charged to supervise the implementation of the Covenant. 
Most notably, I will examine its general comments, viewed to reflect the State Parties’ 
agreement on the interpretation of the ICESCR, and thereby constituting subsequent 
practice in terms of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.24 As such, the general comments issued 
by the Committee may be considered to represent the most authoritative interpretations 
of the Covenant provisions.25 
 
 
In order to shed light on the circumstances under which retrogressive measures may be 
considered justifiable, two further documents are of particular interest: first, a statement 
by the Committee clarifying how it might proceed when considering alleged violations 
under the Optional Protocol,26 and second, a 2012 letter issued by the Chairperson of the 
 
 
 
22 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 October 1945, 33 UNTS 993. 
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
24 General comments may moreover contribute to the formation of customary international law by the 
shaping of opinio juris and state practice, see Mechlem, 2009, pp. 920, 930. 
25 Scheinin, 1997, p. 444. 
26 CESCR, an evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “maximum of available resources” under an 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant, 10 May 2007, UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1. 
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Committee concerning “the protection of Covenant rights in the context of the economic 
and financial crisis”.27 Despite not being legal sources in terms of the traditional sources 
of international law as described above, they are repeatedly referred to by the Committee, 
and might thereby develop into assuming legal weight.28 It is moreover noteworthy that 
while the Committee’s approach to non-retrogression might not be identical for purposes 
of monitoring vis-à-vis adjudication, its concluding observations, general comments and 
other statements may provide for important guidance on how it might consider the state 
obligations flowing from the Covenant when adjudicating complaints under the Optional 
Protocol.29 
 
 
Once the focus of the thesis is shifted towards the judicial enforcement of the Covenant 
rights, jurisprudence in the form of decisions by international, regional, and national 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies will provide for valuable interpretative aid. As such, the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (SACC) is given particular 
weight, since, as will be examined below, it contributed significantly to the drafting of 
the Optional Protocol. The travaux preparatoires of the Covenant will moreover be 
examined as a supplementary means of interpretation when determining the relationship 
between retrogressive measures and formal limitations. Finally, as an invaluable, albeit 
subsidiary source of law, the work of socioeconomic scholars will be used throughout the 
thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
28 For an overview on the concept of soft law, see generally Thürer, 2013. 
29 Indeed, this is indicated by the Committee in its 2007 statement, para. 2. 
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2. The nature of state obligations in relation to socioeconomic rights 
 
2.1. Three typologies of socioeconomic rights 
 
2.1.1. The ICESCR, ICCPR, and the legal nature of socioeconomic rights obligations 
 
In order to answer the question of how the concept of non-retrogression should be 
interpreted and applied, one must first have a primary understanding of the underlying 
obligations flowing from the ICESCR. Most notably, whereas civil and political rights 
are characterized as entailing primarily negative obligations, and thus requiring the state 
to abstain from interfering with such rights, socioeconomic rights are described as 
entailing mainly positive obligations, thus requiring positive action by the state, without 
which they cannot be realized. By analogy, and in contrast to civil and political rights, 
socioeconomic rights have been regarded as relatively resource-intensive, capable of 
realization only in the long term.30  This perceived difference between the two sets of 
rights is arguably the most commonly raised argument concerning the alleged non- 
justiciability of socioeconomic rights.31 Importantly, however, although socioeconomic 
rights may require relatively greater involvement by the state, civil and political rights 
too, require positive action for their realization.32 
 
 
In line with the above, socioeconomic rights similarly impose obligations “traditionally” 
associated with the obligations flowing from the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),33 i.e. obligations of negative and immediate nature.34 As will 
be discussed in more detail below, negative obligations are particularly relevant in 
relation to the main subject of this thesis: the concept of non-retrogression.35 Importantly 
therefore, all human rights, whether civil, cultural, economic, political or social, give rise 
to a variety of state obligations, regardless of the Covenant they stem from. In order to 
 
 
30 Alston & Quinn, 1987, p. 159, Sepúlveda 2003, p. 3. 
31 Bilchitz, 2014, p. 714. 
32 It would for instance be difficult to argue that the right to a fair trial could be realized without any 
positive state action ensuring that there is a functioning judicial system in place, see Alston & Quinn 
1987, p. 184. 
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 993 
UNTS 3. 
34 Sepúlveda, 2003, p. 14. 
35 The question of whether the obligation not to take retrogressive measures is of immediate nature would 
appear to require further research. One scholar arguing that it is, indeed, of immediate nature is Aoife 
Nolan, noting that ”because the prohibition of taking retrogressive steps applies to existing measures of 
implementation of ESR, it has to be of effect immediately, in order to provide effective protection”. See 
Nolan, 2014, p. 64. 
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de-emphasize the at least partly artificial conceptual distinction between the nature of 
civil and political rights on the one hand, and socioeconomic rights on the other, the 
obligations flowing from the ICESCR are often analysed in light of the ‘tripartite 
typology’ of respect, protect and fulfil.36 This framework, examined more in detail below, 
is particularly useful by being mutually applicable to all human rights, thus highlighting 
their indivisibility.37 
 
 
2.1.2. The ‘tripartite typology’ of rights 
 
The first obligation of the tripartite typology, the obligation to respect, imposes a duty 
upon states to refrain from interfering with existing levels of access to rights.38 In terms 
of the ICESCR, the obligation to respect requires states not to interfere with the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.39  For instance, it entails that states 
should abstain from carrying out forced evictions without guarantees of alternative 
housing.40 As will be examined in subsequent chapters, it correlates closely with the duty 
not to take retrogressive measures, i.e. the concept of non-retrogression.41 While in most 
cases entailing an obligation to refrain from certain action, and thus understood as the 
least resource-intensive obligation, 42 it may also require states to take positive action in 
order to ensure that existing levels of rights are maintained.43 This is particularly relevant 
in order to ensure a continued access to rights by disadvantaged members of society, 
especially in times of severe resource constraints.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Eide 1984, p. 154. The tripartite typology was originally elaborated by Shue in 1980, where his 
proposal included the obligations “to avoid depriving”, “to protect from deprivation” and “to aid the 
deprived”, see further, Shue 1980, p. 52. 
37 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, 25 
June 1993, UN doc. A/CONF.157/23, at para. 5. 
38 Nolan & Dutschke 2010, p. 3, Bilchitz, 2014, p. 715. 
39 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter the 
Maastricht guidelines), 1998, para. 6. 
40   See e.g. CESCR, Djazia and Bellini v. Spain, Communication No. 5/2015, paras. 15.1-5; CESCR 
General Comment No. 7 The right to adequate housing (Art. 11.1): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, 
E/1998/22, para. 17. 
41 See further, chapter 5.1. 
42 Riedel 2012, p. 135. 
43 Nolan & Dutschke, 2010, p. 3. 
44 O’Connell et. al., 2014, p. 91. 
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The second obligation requires states to protect the rights of individuals from third party 
interference.45 While not having adopted the tripartite typology, the European Committee 
on Social Rights (ECSR) has dealt with the obligation to protect by noting that it will be 
authorized to consider cases “even if the state has not acted as an operator but has simply 
failed to put an end to the alleged violations in its capacity as regulator”.46 The obligation 
to protect has similarly been addressed by the CESCR, for instance in relation to the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health, by stating that it requires states to adopt 
legislation ensuring equal access to health care; to ensure that privatization does not 
threaten the proper functioning of health facilities, goods and services; and that medical 
practitioners meet appropriate standards of education, skill and ethics.47 In relation to the 
right to water, the Committee has moreover noted that in order to ensure that an equal, 
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water is not 
compromised, states are required to establish regulatory systems that include independent 
monitoring and genuine public participation, as well as the imposition of penalties in the 
case of non-compliance.48 The obligation to protect thus requires states to establish 
effective systems of regulation, monitoring and deterrence, in order to “prevent, punish 
and remedy violations committed by third parties”.49 
 
 
More than the other two types of obligations, the obligation to fulfil is described as 
requiring an active role by the state in the form of legislative, administrative, judicial, 
budgetary and other measures.50 In addition to being viewed as the most resource- 
dependent obligation, the obligation to fulfil often raises most questions concerning its 
content and scope.51 This might not be fully coincidental, since, as argued by Koch, 
resource-demanding obligations are often followed by vague definitions.52 The open- 
endedness of the obligation to fulfil might be beneficial by allowing states to respond as 
 
 
 
 
45 Ibid., pp. 92-97, Wills & Warwick 2016, p. 13. 
46 European Committee on Social Rights (hereinafter ECSR), Marangupolous Foundation for Human 
Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, Complaint No. 30/2005, decision on admissibility, 30 October 2005, para. 14. 
47 CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 11 August 
2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para. 35. 
48 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, 20 January 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, para 24. 
49 O’Connell et al, 2014, p. 95, citing Nolan, 2009, p. 251. 
50 Riedel, 2012, p. 135. 
51 O’Connell et al, 2014, pp. 97-102. 
52 Koch, 2003, p. 12. 
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necessary in accordance with the circumstances at hand. Some guidance to its content 
may nevertheless be drawn from the general comments of the CESCR. 
 
 
Indeed, in relation to the right to health the Committee has stated that “[v]iolations of the 
obligation to fulfil occur through the failure of States parties to take all necessary steps to 
ensure the realization of the right to health”.53 Such violations may occur by a variety of 
ways, for example through the failure to adopt a national policy on how the relevant right 
should be realized; insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources that lead 
to the non-enjoyment of the right; the failure to monitor the realization of the right at the 
national level, for example by identifying indicators and benchmarks; and the failure to 
take measures to reduce the inequitable distribution of resources.54 The obligation to fulfil 
has moreover been divided into the obligations to facilitate, promote and provide, referred 
to by the Committee in various general comments.55 The obligation to facilitate requires 
states to “proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and 
utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood”.56 The obligation to promote 
requires states to undertake a number of measures in order to “create, maintain and 
restore” access to rights.57 Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable to realise a 
right on their own (for grounds reasonably considered beyond their control) the obligation 
to provide requires states to realize that right directly.58 
 
 
While the tripartite typology is primarily a conceptual tool elaborated by scholars, it is 
widely applied by the Committee, and has provided states with important guidance on 
how to implement their duties.59 The division of state obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfil has furthermore furthered the avoidance of a two-dimensional understanding of 
 
 
 
53 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 52. 
54 Ibid. 
55 CESCR, General Comment No 19: The Right to Social Security, 4 February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19, 
paras. 47-50; CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para. 25; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para 37. 
56 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, E/C.12/1999/5, para. 15. 
57 Nolan & Dutschke, 2010, p. 3. Such measures might, for instance, include research; the provision of 
information; and by ensuring that authorities are trained to recognize the needs of particularly 
disadvantaged groups of society, see General Comment No. 14, para. 37. 
58 In relation to the right to social security, for example, states are required to create non-contributory 
schemes for the protection individuals and groups who are unable to make sufficient contributions to 
fulfil their right to social security on their own, see CESCR, General Comment No. 19: The Right to 
Social Security, 4 February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19, para. 50; CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 15. 
59 Griffey, 2011, p. 289. 
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human rights obligations, based on the covenant they stem from.60 Importantly, therefore, 
the tripartite typology demonstrates that socioeconomic rights implicate a full range of 
obligations, requiring states both to refrain from infringing existing levels of access to 
rights, as well as to take action in order to ensure that they are protected and fulfilled. As 
will be examined in subsequent chapters, the tripartite typology may provide an important 
tool for the Committee when deciding upon the permissibility of retrogressive measures 
under the Optional Protocol. 
 
 
2.1.3. Obligations of conduct and obligations of result 
 
A final noteworthy framework when analysing the obligations stemming from the 
ICESCR, is the division of obligations into what the International Law Commission (ILC) 
has termed ‘obligations of conduct’ and ‘obligations of result’.61 Whereas the former 
obliges states to undertake certain measures in pursuit of a given result, the latter one 
obliges states to achieve a certain outcome, irrespective of the form of conduct.62 Except 
for the elementary, but arguably vague obligation “to take steps” as contained in article 2 
(1) of the Covenant,63 the Covenant is argued not to impose specific obligations of 
result.64  Both dimensions nevertheless apply mutually to all human rights and form an 
inseparable understanding of how the state obligations under the Covenant should be 
viewed.65 Accordingly, the tripartite obligations of respect, protect and fulfil, 
respectively, consist of both obligations of conduct and obligations of result.66 
 
 
2.2. Article 2(1) ICESCR: a general starting point 
 
2.2.1. The concept of progressive realization 
 
Much of the present confusion over the normative content of the concept of non- 
retrogression is arguably attributable to article 2(1), one of the most central obligations- 
related provisions of the Covenant.67 In contrast to rights-based obligations, reflecting 
 
 
60 Griffey, 2011, p. 289. 
61 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on State Responsibility with commentaries thereto 
adopted by the International Law Commission on first reading, January 1997, articles 20 and 21. 
62 Ibid. 
63 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 2. 
64 De Schutter, 2019, p. 565. 
65 Leckie, 1998, p. 92. 
66 The Maastricht Guidelines, 1998, para. 7. 
67 Sepúlveda, 2003, p. 16. 
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the direct enjoyment by individuals of specific rights, article 2(1) spells out the nature 
of the general legal obligations undertaken by State Parties in relation to the Covenant 
as a whole.68 Article 2(1) thus establishes the way in which they much behave in order 
to respect, protect and to fulfil the substantive rights of the Covenant.69 It reads as 
following: 
 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
 
Essentially, the concept of progressive realization imposes a duty to take appropriate 
measures, to the maximum of available resources, in order to achieve the full realization 
of the Covenant rights. The reference to the availability of resources is inherently a 
recognition of the varying levels of development and resources available to different 
states, against which the expectations and obligations of the ICESCR will be 
measured.70 While the above implies that the full realization of the Covenant rights may 
not be possible immediately, states are nevertheless obliged to demonstrate that actual 
progress is made in the enjoyment of rights.71 
 
 
Available resources must moreover be optimally prioritized and used in an increasingly 
effective manner.72 The need to optimize the use of resources is particularly important 
during times of severe resource constraints, such as armed conflicts or economic crises. 
In such circumstances, states are under an heightened obligation to protect marginalized 
groups of society,73 for example through the provision of low-cost targeted 
programmes,74 and by ensuring that policies and legislation are not “designed to benefit 
 
 
 
68 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
69 Sepúlveda, 2003, p. 16. 
70 Chapman, 1996, pp. 23,38. 
71 O’Connell et al., 2014, p. 67. 
72 Eide, 2000, p.126. See further, chapter 3.3.2. 
73 Griffey, 2011, p. 282. 
74 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 12; CESCR, General Comment No. 5: Persons with 
Disabilities, 9 December 1994, E/1995/22, para. 10; CESCR, General Comment No. 6: The Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, 8 December 1995, E/1996/22, para. 17. 
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already advantaged social groups at the expense of others”.75 Moreover, the concept of 
progressive realization is argued to impose not only a duty to expand the access to rights, 
but also to improve their implementation. Rights should thus be made available to both 
a larger number and a wider range of people.76 
 
 
In addition to article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the obligation of progressive realization is 
recognized by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),77 as well as the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).78 At the regional level, 
progressive realization is recognized by article 26 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights,79  and is suggested to be implied by articles 61 and 62 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.80 Similarly, while progressive realization is not 
recognized expressly in a general obligations-related provision by the European Social 
Charter (ESC),81 the jurisprudence of the ECSR suggests that it is implicit therein.82 It 
is moreover provided in relation to social security in article 12(3) of the ESC. 
 
 
As is well-known, the wording of article 2(1) of the ICESCR differs significantly from 
the wording of article 2(1) in its sister Covenant: whereas the ICESCR imposes the duty 
to progressively realize the Covenant rights, the ICCPR imposes a duty to “respect and 
to ensure” the rights therein.83 While the difference in wording reflects a recognition of 
the varying levels of available resources to states, and thus a rejection of a uniform set 
 
 
 
75 CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, 13 December 1991, E/1992/23, 
para. 11. 
76 Liebenberg, 2001, pp. 232, 241, See also Grootboom, para. 45. 
77 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, art. 4. 
78 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3, art. 4(2). 
79 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, art. 4 (2). 
80 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1 June 1981, OAU No. 26363. See further, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2011, 
para. 14. 
81 European Social Charter (hereinafter ESC), 18 October 1961, ETS no. 035. 
82 Such an understanding is supported by Autisme-Europe v. France, for instance, where the Committee 
found France to have violated the right to integration and education of persons with disabilities, by failing 
to take adequate measures to increase the education of persons with autism compared to other persons. 
The Committee noted that even in situations where the achievement of a right would be particularly 
expensive or complex, states must take measures “within a reasonable time with measurable progress and 
to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources” in order to realize the objectives of 
the Charter, See ECSR, International Association Autism-Europe v. France, Collective Complaint No. 
13/2002, decided on the merits, 4 November 2003, para. 53. 
83 ICCPR, article 2(1). 
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of obligations flowing from the ICESCR, the relatively vague language of article 2(1) 
ICESCR has arguably contributed to the treatment of socioeconomic rights as 
aspirations rather than fully-fledged rights.84  Nevertheless, due to the recognition of 
socioeconomic rights in a broad range of human rights instruments during the last three 
decades and the entry into force of the OP-ICESCR, today, their status as real, justiciable 
rights is beyond dispute. 
 
 
Even though the concept of progressive realization is in many respects the cornerstone 
of the Covenant, its meaning should not be overstated. In particular,  the Covenant also 
imposes a number of obligations of immediate effect.85 As has been noted by the 
Committee, the obligation of ‘taking steps’ is in itself of immediate nature.86 Such steps 
must be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations recognized in the Covenant”.87 Moreover, in terms of substantive 
obligations, states have to ensure immediately the enjoyment of all rights without 
discrimination,88 and the access of everyone to minimum essential levels of each right.89 
Importantly, states also have a number of immediate duties in terms of procedural 
nature, including: the adoption of a national action plan and placing it under regular 
monitoring;90 ensuring the participation of relevant stake-holders in decision-making;91 
and, establishing accountability mechanisms and providing for remedies in the event of 
violations.92 
 
 
By recognizing the ability of states to progressively develop the Covenant rights in order 
to achieve their full realization over time, article 2(1) can be understood to involve two 
main elements. As noted by the Committee, it is on the one hand “a necessary flexibility 
device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any 
 
 
84 See e.g. Chapman, 1996, p. 39, Warwick and Wills, 2016, pp. 7-8. 
85 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para 1, The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1986, principle 22. 
86 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 1. 
87 Ibid., para. 2 
88 Ibid., para. 1 
89 Ibid., para 10. See further, chapter 3.3.4. 
90 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(f). 
91 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rigths (OHCHR), Report of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 8 June 
2009, UN Doc. E/2009/100, para. 33. 
92 Ibid. 
16  
 
country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights”.93 As 
examined above, this would appear to reflect the varying possibilities of states to realize 
the Covenant rights at a set pace. Interpreting the notion of progressive realization too 
loosely, so as to postpone the realization of the rights to an indefinite future, would, 
however, be to deprive the obligation of all meaningful content. On the other hand, 
therefore, the notion of progressive realization must be read in light of the object and 
purpose of the ICESCR: the establishment of clear obligations in order to reach the full 
achievement of all the rights recognized therein.94  In combination with the immediate 
obligation of taking concrete, deliberate and targeted steps, State Parties are thus obliged 
to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. 95  As has been 
stated by Nolan and Dutschke, progressive realization is thus essentially a means to an 
end.96 
 
 
Of the above follows, that article 2 (1) may be understood to involve an obligation of 
 
advancing the broader coverage and enjoyment of socioeconomic rights over time.97 
 
From such an “obligation of advancement” follows, that when a state undertakes to 
improve and expand the protection and coverage of the Covenant rights, it simultaneously 
undertakes not to reduce already achieved levels of access to them.98 Implicit in the 
obligation of taking steps to progressively realize socioeconomic rights, is thus the 
concept of non-retrogression. 
 
 
2.2.2. The concept of non-retrogression as a corollary to progressive realization 
 
The concept of non-retrogression was first introduced by the Committee in its general 
comment No. 3, the attempt of which was to outline the various obligations imposed by 
article 2(1). It may thus be understood as the “natural corollary” to the concept of 
progressive realization.99 According to the Committee: 
 
 
 
 
 
93 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
94 Ibid., 
95 Ibid., 
96 Nolan & Dutschke, 2010, p. 2. 
97 Nolan et al., 2014, p. 123. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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…any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources.100 
 
 
Of the above follows, that there is a presumption against the permissibility of ‘deliberately 
retrogressive measures’.101 Regrettably, however the Committee has not provided for any 
proper definition over how retrogressive measures should understood. Neither has the 
Committee attempted to define the difference between deliberate and other retrogressive 
measures.102 Some guidance may nevertheless be derived from the Committee’s General 
Comment No. 4, which, albeit without mentioning the term ‘retrogressive measures’, 
states that: 
 
 
…a general decline in living and housing conditions, directly attributable to policy and legislative 
decisions by States parties, and in the absence of accompanying compensatory measures, would be 
inconsistent with the obligations under the Covenant.103 
 
 
In interpreting the above statement, Sepúlveda has defined the meaning of a ‘deliberately 
retrogressive measure’ as: “any measure that implies a step back in the level of protection 
accorded to the rights contained in the Covenant which is the consequence of an 
intentional decision by the State”.104 In concrete terms, retrogressive measures might 
include the adoption of legislation or a policy reducing the access to socioeconomic rights 
or public expenditure, e.g. in the form of cuts to social benefits or services such as basic 
health care and primary education.105 The Committee’s arguably most far-reaching 
exemplification of the actual meaning of a retrogressive measure may be found in General 
Comment No. 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health, in which it lists the 
following examples of retrogressive measures: 
 
 
a)    the removal of sexual and reproductive health medications from national drug registries; 
 
b)   laws or policies revoking public health funding for sexual and reproductive health services; 
 
 
 
100 CESCR; General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
101 Sepúlveda. 2014, p. 27. 
102 Ibid., p. 133. 
103 CESCR, general comment No. 4, para. 11. 
104 Sepúlveda, 2003, p. 323. 
105 Sepúlveda, 2014, p. 27. 
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c) imposition of barriers to information, goods and services relating to sexual and reproductive health; 
 
d)   enacting laws criminalizing certain sexual and reproductive health conduct and decisions; and, 
 
e) legal and policy changes that reduce oversight by States of the obligation of private actors to respect 
the right of individuals to access sexual and reproductive health services106 
 
 
Importantly, as noted by Langford and King, the concept of non-retrogression does not 
impose an absolute bar to measures restricting the access to socioeconomic rights of 
particular individuals or groups; rather, such measures are reviewed under “a particularly 
strong form of scrutiny” and require a “high level of justification”.107 Indeed, by noting 
that article 2(1) should be interpreted as a flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the 
real world,108 the Committee thus appears to imply that retrogressive measures may be 
justifiable in at least some circumstances. With that said, the Committee has been argued 
to equate retrogressive measures with prima facie violations of the Covenant; hence, 
where such measures are demonstrated to have taken place, the burden of proof would 
shift to the state to justify its conduct.109 The important question to be answered is thus 
when such backsliding will be permissible. Before turning to said question, however, it is 
worth to first examine the general limitations clause of the Covenant. 
 
 
2.3. The general limitations clause: a brief overview 
 
Set forth in article 4 of the Covenant, the general limitations clause provides for the 
circumstances under which the Covenant rights may be subjected to limitations. It reads 
as following: 
 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided 
by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such 
limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 CESCR, General Comment No. 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health, 2 May 2016, 
E/C.12/GC/22, para. 38. 
107 Langford & King, 2009, p. 502. 
108 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
109 Nolan et. al., 2014, p. 124. 
19  
 
In order for a limitation to be compliant with article 4, it must therefore satisfy three 
essential safeguards.110 The first safeguard obliges states to ensure that any limitation 
be “determined by law”. In terms of formal requirements, the limitation must be 
provided by generally applicable national law compatible with the Covenant,111 in force 
at the time when the limitation was applied.112 Importantly, “law” is not understood as 
statute law exclusively, but may also encompass unwritten law.113 Further, the national 
provision imposing the limitation is required to be adequately accessible, i.e. publicly 
available, in a sufficiently precise form, so that individuals can foresee the consequences 
of their conduct, and regulate their conduct accordingly.114 Finally, in terms of 
substantive requirements, the Limburg principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Limburg Principles), 
adopted in 1986 by a group of distinguished experts in international law, state that 
national laws imposing limitations may not be arbitrary, unreasonable or 
discriminatory.115 
 
 
The second safeguard requires that any limitation be compatible “with the nature of 
these [economic, social and cultural] rights”. The interpretative difficulties relating to 
the phrase are linked not only to its seemingly vague formulation, the lack of 
consideration by the Committee, but also because no similar phrasing is included in 
other human rights instruments. It is thus unclear how exactly the ‘nature’ of 
socioeconomic rights should be understood. Some scholars argue that it reflects the 
concept of the minimum core content of rights,116 as examined further in chapter 3.3.4, 
 
 
 
110 ICESCR, article 4. Due to the Committee’s limited interpretation of article 4, including the safeguards 
therein, interpretative aid will be drawn from the Limburg principles and the practice of other human 
rights treaty bodies. 
111 CESCR, General Comment No 15: The Right to Water, 20 January 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, para 56. 
112 See e.g., The Limburg Principles, principle 48, Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General 
Comment N. 19: Article 23 (The Family) Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of 
the Spouses, 27 July 1990, para. 4. 
113 European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), Sunday Times v. UK, 1979, para 47. However, 
mere administrative provisions are not regarded as sufficient, see ECtHR, Silver v. UK, 1983, para. 86. 
114 Limburg principles, principle 50; ECtHR, Sunday Times v. UK, 1979, para. 49. 
115 Limburg principles, principle 49. The Limburg principles were convened by experts from the 
International Commission of Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the University of Limburg and the Urban 
Morgan Institute for Human Rights, 
116 See e.g. Müller 2009, p. 579-583. Such an interpretation would appear to be supported by the Limburg 
principles, according to which ‘the nature of these rights’ would prohibit limitations that “jeopardize the 
essence of the rights concerned”, see principle 56. 
20  
 
whereby limitations conflicting with “minimum essential levels” of rights would not be 
considered justifiable.117  Another interpretation has been derived from a statement of 
the Chilean representative during the drafting process of the Covenant, noting that “the 
problem of restrictions, and limits to their scope, should be closely studied in connexon 
with each of the rights proclaimed in the Covenant”.118 While reflecting a supplementary 
means of interpretation,119 the statement has been argued to indicate that ‘the nature of 
these rights’ would prohibit sweeping limitations in relation to all or many ESC rights 
simultaneously.120 
 
 
The third safeguard laid down by article 4 is the requirement that all limitations be made 
with the sole aim of “promoting general welfare in a democratic society”.121 This 
distinguishes the ICESCR from other human rights treaties, generally allowing 
limitations to be justified in relation to a number of legitimate aims.122  The travaux 
preparatoires of article 4 ICESCR reveal that such considerations were regarded as 
inappropriate for the justification of limitations to socioeconomic rights as compared to 
civil and political rights.123  It should be noted, however, that article 8 on the right to 
strike and to form and join trade unions includes a more permissible limitations clause 
of its own.124 
 
 
Importantly, a number of indications suggest that article 4 should be interpreted in 
relatively restrictive terms. Indeed, it is noted by the Limburg principles that article 4 
was “primarily intended to be protective of the rights of individuals rather than 
permissive of the imposition of limitations by the State”.125  Examining the drafting 
 
 
117 The minimum core was first referred to by the Committee in General Comment No. 3, para 10. 
118 Mr. Santa Cruz, Chile, Summary Record of the 235th meeting of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, 2 July 1951, Un Doc E/CN.4/SR.235. 
119 VCLT, 1969, article 32. 
120 Alston & Quinn 1987, p. 201. 
121 See further, chapter 5.1. 
122 The ESC, for instance, allows limitations by reference to “public interest, national security, public 
health and morals”, ESC, article 31(1), revised ESC, article G. 
123 Summary record of the 234th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 2 July 1951. 
E/CN.4/SR.234, see statements by the Lebanese and Indian representatives, at 20, 23. 
124 Article 8(1)(a) and (c) of the ICESCR resembles limitations clauses provided by other human rights 
treaties by permitting limitations “in the interest of national security or public order or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others”. This might be a consequence of the fact that the rights recognized 
therein to a larger degree resemble civil and political rights compared to the other Covenant rights. 
125 Limburg principles, 1987, principle 46. 
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history of article 4, such a reference may well reflect the fact that the limitations clause 
was included with the narrowest possible majority.126 In its rare references to the 
limitations clause, the Committee has itself cited the above wording of the Limburg 
principles, seemingly reiterating a restrictive interpretation of the limitations clause.127 
 
 
The restrictive interpretation of article 4 is moreover supported by; first, the explicit 
rejection of any other legitimate aims (e.g., public order, public morality, the respect for 
rights and freedoms of others, or national security, which was never even deliberated 
upon in relation to article 4), and second, the explicit inclusion of such aims in relation to 
article 8(1) ICESCR. As explained by Alston and Quinn, however, there may be 
circumstances, albeit limited, under which justifications other than ‘general welfare’ may 
be legitimately invoked. This, provided that a state is able to prove that its aim, such as 
the rights and freedoms of others or national security, is genuinely identical with that of 
‘general welfare’.128 
 
 
 
Before turning to how such complaints should be approached by the Committee under 
the Optional Protocol, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the content and 
scope of the concept of non-retrogression. In the following chapter, therefore, I will 
examine the challenges linked to its interpretation and application by the Committee, the 
criteria through which state compliance is measured, and the viewpoint in light of which 
compliance should be scrutinized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 The vote on whether to include a general limitations clause was decided favourably by only nine votes 
to eight, with one abstention. See summary record of the 308th meeting of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, 6 June 1952, E/CN.4/SR.308, at 8. 
127 CESCR, General comment No. 13: The Right to Education, 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, para 
42; general comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 11 August 2000, 
E/C.12/2000/4, para. 46. 
128 Alston & Quinn 1987, p. 173. 
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3. The evolving content of the concept of non-retrogression 
 
3.1. Challenges to the interpretation and application of the concept of non- 
retrogression 
 
Despite the central role of the concept of non-retrogression, the Committee appears to 
have had challenges in applying it in a consistent manner. Moreover, it rarely applies the 
label of ‘retrogressive measures’ to measures it seems to be addressing as such.129 Of this 
follows, that the concept of non-retrogression suffers from an ambiguous normative 
content to guide its interpretation and application in a given context. The underlying 
factors behind the Committee’s cautious approach towards non-retrogression are thus 
worth examination. 
 
 
The first factor relates to the two elements of retrogressive measures: normative and 
empirical.130 Whereas the adjudication of normative, de jure retrogression merely 
concerns the assessment of whether a particular legislation has reduced or increased the 
legal protection of socioeconomic rights, the adjudication of empirical retrogression 
requires more complex assessments of the factual impact by the action/inaction on the 
enjoyment of rights. Indeed, determining de facto retrogression would require the 
Committee to inquire into the reasonableness of diverse measures, the assessment of 
which generally requires long-term monitoring through the collection and analysis of 
sophisticated sets of data. Such challenges are aggravated by the failure of states to 
conduct human rights impacts assessments ex ante, to be able to assess the foreseeable 
impacts of their proposed policy changes.131 Moreover, the plurality of involved actors 
such as private entities, national governments and intergovernmental bodies, can make it 
difficult to determine and distribute responsibility.132 
 
 
Another key factor is the requirement of a broad economic knowledge. Assessing de facto 
 
retrogression will necessarily implicate questions relating to the generation and allocation 
 
 
 
 
129 See e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations on the initial report of South Africa, 19 November 2018, 
E/C.12/ZAF/CO/1, paras. 19-20. 
130 Nolan et al, 2014, pp. 127-128. 
131 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Protecting Fundamental Rights During the 
Economic Crisis, 2010. See further, Guiding principles on human rights impact assessment of economic 
reforms, Un Doc. A/HRC/40/57, 2019, principle 19. 
132 FRA, Protecting Fundamental Rights During the Economic Crisis, 2010, pp. 129-130. 
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of resources, the answers to which vary according to competing schools of economic 
thought.133 For example, whereas the neo-classical school would generally advocate for 
flexibility in terms of labour protection in order to be competitive and thereby promote 
economic growth, in contrast, the Keynesian view of thought would generally consider 
such measures ineffective, since unemployment is believed to be a consequence of a lack 
in demand, resolvable only through the protection of decent wages.134 Courts thus tend to 
avoid entering into debates over the choice of economic policy, often perceived as 
generally irresolvable and lacking empirical certainty.135 Due to the Committee’s lack of 
economic expertise and sufficient resources for statistical monitoring it has generally 
focused on the normative aspects of non-retrogression.136 
 
 
The above conforms with the general premise of the U.N. human rights system, based on 
the separation of law and politics. Questions of political nature are thus generally 
understood to be outside the scope of human rights bodies’ mandate.137 This 
understanding is shared by the Committee, according to which it “neither requires nor 
precludes any particular form of government or economic system being used, provided 
only that it is democratic and  that all human rights are thereby respected”. 138  The 
committee thus insists on its neutrality whether “socialist or a capitalist system, or a 
mixed, centrally planned, or laissez-faire economy”.139 State compliance should therefore 
not be measured solely based on the amount of public expenditure devoted to the 
realization of socioeconomic rights, since this would clearly contradict the political and 
economic neutrality of the Covenant.140 Wills and Warwick nevertheless argue that the 
Committee, acting as though neutral in relation to the austerity measures adopted during 
the 2007-2008 economic and financial crisis, in fact pursued a variant of the neo- 
liberalism. They insist that: “failing to take a stance in relation to a dominant political 
trend can be to politically acquiesce to that trend”. 141 
 
 
 
133 Desierto, 2015, pp. 304-305. 
134 Uprimny & Guarnizo, 2008, p. 12. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Nolan et al, 2014, p. 129. 
137 Wills & Warwick, 2016, p. 23. 
138 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para 8. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Dowell-Jones, 2004, p. 49. 
141 Wills & Warwick, 2016, p. 24. 
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While expressing a valid point, the alternative might not be problem-free either: a too 
rigid interpretation of the concept of non-retrogression will namely risk causing 
unintended human rights impacts.142 Indeed, as will be examined in more detail in chapter 
4, applying an overly strict set of criteria when assessing the compatibility of retrogressive 
measures might hamper the ability of states to adjust their policies, even for the benefit 
of less advantaged groups of society. If equated with a prohibition, the concept of non- 
retrogression would thus impede redistributive efforts by states, aiming to achieve 
progressive realization in relation to the population as a whole.143  Concluding that the 
Committee, by applying a “neutral” approach to retrogression, would automatically be 
ascribing to a particular school of economic thought, might thus be hasty. 
 
 
Finally, the reluctance by the Committee to address whether particular state conduct 
amounts to non-retrogression is argued to be “both a cause and a consequence of the fact 
that we are in the early stages in the evolution of the normative content of non- 
retrogression”.144 Accordingly, the unclear normative content of the concept has rendered 
it difficult for the Committee to identify when a particular measure constitutes a 
retrogression, and even harder to assess whether it may be justified.145  The aim of the 
following chapter is thus to delineate the criteria applied by the Committee in assessing 
compliance with the concept of non-retrogression. 
 
 
3.2. The Committee’s evolving approach towards non-retrogression 
 
As noted above, the concept of non-retrogression does not constitute an absolute 
prohibition against the adoption of retrogressive measures. The Committee has 
nevertheless struggled to provide for a balanced set of criteria to determine the 
circumstances under which such measures may be considered justified. Moreover, the 
criteria against which retrogressive measures are to be assessed have been subject to 
frequent change. Of this follows, that the application of the concept of non-retrogression 
might risk being unforeseeable. While the Committee’s approach to non-retrogression 
 
 
142 Sepúlveda 2003, p. 428, Nohlan et al, 2014, pp. 130-131. 
143 See chapter 4.2. 
144 Nolan et. al, 2014, p. 132. 
145 Sepúlveda, 2003, p. 332. 
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will vary depending on the supervisory process it is operating through –  i.e. through the 
periodic state reporting process or the individual complaints procedure – its concluding 
observations, general comments and statements may guide its interpretation under the 
Optional Protocol.146 It is thus worth examining how the Committee has sought to develop 
its interpretation of the concept of non-retrogression in light of the above instruments. 
 
 
Some initial guidance is provided by the 1991 General Comment No. 3, which, as noted, 
is the Committee’s first reference to non-retrogression. In it, the Committee states that 
any deliberately retrogressive measures must be justified “against the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources”.147 The first question is thus how the notion of ‘the totality of the rights’ should 
be understood? As a minimum standard, Nolan et al. have suggested that it would oblige 
states to demonstrate that a retrogressive measure adopted would be beneficial to at least 
some group of society.148 Similarly, as set forth by the Maastricht Guidelines – adopted 
in 1998 by a group of more than thirty experts with the objective of elaborating upon the 
Limburg principles – retrogressive measures might be justified if “done with the purpose 
and effect of increasing equality and improving the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights for the most vulnerable groups”.149 Read together, retrogression might thus 
be justified against the totality of the Covenant rights, if resorted to in order to achieve 
decreased inequality by providing for greater coverage of socioeconomic rights 
protection for disadvantaged groups of society. 
 
 
The other question relates to the notion of ‘the full use of the maximum available 
resources’. This second phrase has been argued to indicate that retrogression would only 
be justifiable when resorted to as a consequence of decreased resources, caused by factors 
beyond the control of the state.150 Alternatively, it could be interpreted to indicate that a 
state would only be allowed to adopt retrogressive measures after having demonstrated 
that it has taken reasonable measures not only to administer existing resources, but also 
to generate new ones, in order to offset potential decreases in public revenue. Moreover, 
 
146 This is indicated by the Committe in its 2007 statement, para. 2. 
147 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
148 Nolan et al 2014, p. 134. 
149 Maastricht Guidelines, 1998, para. 14 (d). 
150 Nolan et al 2014, p. 134. 
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as noted by the Committee in Djazia and Bellini, the State Party would be required to 
explain why it was necessary to adopt the retrogressive measure at hand.151  Simply by 
referring to resource scarcity, or any other justification, is therefore insufficient without 
a clarification as to the underlying reasons explaining why the measure was necessary for 
the protection of the totality of the Covenant rights. 
 
 
Subsequent practice of the Committee points towards a more substantial approach to non- 
retrogression. Arguably, such practice was influenced by the adoption of the Maastricht 
guidelines, proclaiming retrogressive measures in violation of the ICESCR.152 One year 
later, the Committee included the adoption of retrogressive measures as an issue to be 
regarded under the section of ‘violations’ in its own guidelines for the drafting of general 
comments.153 A more robust approach to non-retrogression was similarly evidenced by 
its consecutive general comments: in general comment No. 13, the Committee insisted 
on  a  “strong  presumption  of  impermissibility  of  any  retrogressive  measures”.154 
Moreover, states would have the burden of proving that such measures were introduced 
 
only after “the most careful consideration of all alternatives”.155 
 
 
 
The Committee has expressly prohibited the adoption of retrogressive measures in two 
contexts: in relation to retrogression that is incompatible with the core content of rights,156 
and in relation to retrogression that is discriminatory.157 Since the prohibition of 
discrimination is an obligation of immediate nature, it would seem to indicate that the 
adoption of retrogressive measures are impermissible in relation to rights that are subject 
 
 
 
151 CESCR, Mohamed Ben Djazia and Naouel Bellini v. Spain (hereinafter Djazia and Bellini v. Spain), 
Communication No. 5/2015, 20 June 2017, UN Doc. E/C./12/61/D/5/2015, at para. 17.6. 
152 Maastricht Guidelines, 1998, para. 14(e), 
153 CESCR, Outline for Drafting General Comments on Specific Rights of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 1999. 
154 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, para. 45; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 32; CESCR, 
General comment No. 15, para. 19; CESCR, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit 
from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
production Which He or She is the Author, 12 January 2006, E/C.12/GC/17, para. 27; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, 6 February 2006, E/C.12/GC/18, para. 21; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 19, para. 42; CESCR, General Comment No. 21, Right of everyone to take part in cultural 
rights, 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21, para. 65. 
155 See general comments in previous footnote, except for General Comment No. 21. 
156 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 48; CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para 42; CESCR, 
General Comment No. 17, para. 27. See further, chapter 3.3.4. 
157 CESCR, General Comment No. 18, para. 34. 
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to immediate obligations.158 Finally, in general comment 19, the Committee provided for 
its most fully-fledged description of the criteria against which non-retrogression would 
be assessed. While some had been provided for either directly or indirectly in previous 
general comments, it would also consider whether: the justification was reasonable; 
alternatives were comprehensively examined; there had been genuine participation of 
affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; the measures have 
a sustained impact on the realization on the right, and finally; whether there had been an 
independent review of the measures at the national level.159 
 
 
Another important instrument for the assessment of non-retrogression is the 2007 
statement ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum Available 
Resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’. In it, the Committee provided 
for a set of “objective criteria” that it would consider when evaluating the explanation of 
a  State Party for having adopted retrogressive measures.160  In contrast to the general 
limitations clause, under which limitations are allowed solely for the ‘promotion of 
general welfare’, the statement revealed that retrogressive measures could be justified 
under article 2(1) as a consequence of resource constraints.161 However, not just any 
justification of retrogression based on resource constraints would be considered 
sufficient; such information would be considered on a country-by-country basis, in light 
of the following criteria: 
 
 
(a) the country’s level of development; 
 
(b) the severity of the alleged breach, in particular whether the situation concerned the enjoyment 
of the minimum core content of the Covenant; 
(c) the country’s current economic situation, in particular whether the country was undergoing a 
 
period of economic recession; 
 
 
 
 
 
158 This is moreover indicated by the CESCR in General Comment No. 23 on the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work, 7 April 2016, E/C.12/GC/23, para. 52. 
159 CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 42. 
160 CESCR, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” 
under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant (hereinafter 2007 statement), 21 September 2007, 
E/C.12/2007/1, para. 10. 
161 The drafting history of the ICESCR suggest that the compatibility of adjustments in the level of access 
to rights due to resource constraints were not intended to be assessed under article 4, but rather under 
article 2 (1). See further chapter 5.1. 
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(d) the existence of other serious claims on the State party’s limited resources; for example, 
resulting from a recent natural disaster or from recent internal or international armed conflict. 
(e) whether the State party had sought to identify low-cost options; 
(f) whether the State party had sought cooperation and assistance or rejected offers of resources 
from the international community for the purposes of implementing the provisions of the 
Covenant without sufficient reason.162 
 
 
Accordingly, the statement provides for examples when retrogressive measures may be 
justified, namely during periods of economic recession (c) as well as natural disasters and 
armed conflicts (d). While the criteria are helpful in understanding how the Committee 
will evaluate retrogression, they are formulated in relatively general terms (arguably so 
as to apply in a global context), thus risking weakening their guiding effect. 163 It might 
for instance be questioned what kind of situation entailing ‘serious’ claims on the State 
party’s limited resources will be considered serious enough. Moreover, as described 
above, it has been argued that the adoption of retrogressive measures would only be 
justifiable as a consequence of decreased resources due to factors beyond the state’s 
control. Considering the multiplicity of responsible actors for the outbreak and 
continuation of both international and national armed conflicts, it is unlikely that the 
Committee would accept retrogression solely based on the existence of an armed 
conflict.164  The same would apply for other serious claims on the resources of a state, 
particularly economic crises. 
 
 
Accordingly, from a rather modest start in 1991, through subsequent general comments, 
concluding observations and statements, the Committee’s has advanced a relatively 
comprehensive set of criteria on how it will apply the concept of non-retrogression in the 
context of periodic state reporting processes. In turn, these criteria might guide the 
Committee when adjudicating retrogression-related complaints under the Optional 
Protocol. It is noteworthy, however, that the Committee’s approach to the concept of non- 
retrogression has not been fully consistent over the course of the last two decades. Indeed, 
in a 2012 letter concerning “the protection of the Covenant rights in the context of the 
 
 
 
 
162 CESCR, 2007 statement, para. 10. 
163 O’Cinneide, 2014, p. 195. 
164 Müller, 2009, p. 587. 
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economic and financial crisis”, 165  the Committee appears to have adopted a relatively 
lenient approach compared to previous instruments as delineated above. 166 
 
 
The way in which the letter assumes a more flexible approach towards retrogression is 
twofold. First is the language used in the letter; it is for instance unequivocally accepted 
that a lack of growth impedes progressive realization, and that some adjustments in the 
implementation of rights are “inevitable”. Moreover, states are prescribed to merely avoid 
the denial of socioeconomic rights rather than refrain from doing so.167 Second, the letter 
appears to have changed the circumstances under which adjustments may be taken (these 
circumstances are examined more closely below). Particularly, the letter does not refer to 
language used in earlier general comments, according to which retrogressive measures 
would need to be justified “against the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant 
and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources”, or when 
introduced after “the most careful consideration of all alternatives”. Neither does it refer 
to a “strong presumption of impermissibility of any retrogressive measures” or to the 
several new criteria introduced by general comment 19, as delineated above.168 Notably, 
in its post-2012 general comments, the Committee has refrained from referring to the 
above jurisprudence on the concept of non-retrogression, instead applying the criteria laid 
down by the 2012 letter.169 
 
 
Notwithstanding that both the 2012 letter and the 2007 statement lack legally binding 
force in terms of the traditional legal sources as set forth by article 38 of the ICJ statute, 
they are nevertheless widely applied by the Committee. As such, they might shape the 
practice of State Parties reacting to them and might thereby contribute to the formation 
of customary international law (while not reflecting state practice in themselves).170 The 
 
 
 
165 Letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter, letter dated 16 May 2012) 
166 According to Warwick, the Committee has moved from an “business as usual” approach to an 
“accommodations” approach: see, Warwick 2016, pp. 255-259. 
167 Warwick 2016, p. 256. 
168 In contrast, the letter seems to be in line with the Committee’s 2007 statement, by accepting the 
possibility to justify retrogressive measures as a consequence of serious claims on the State party’s 
limited resources. 
169 See CESCE, General Comment No. 22, para 38; CESCR, General Comment No. 23, para. 52. 
170 See e.g. Wood, 2016, p. 8. 
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Committee has moreover referred to the 2012 letter in the communication Djazia and 
Bellini v. Spain, the only complaint so far where it has considered the doctrine on non- 
retrogression.171 This would appear to suggest that the Committee is, indeed, guided by 
the 2012 letter when assessing individual complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
Importantly, however, neither in the letter nor in the above communication has the 
Committee expressly stated how the “adjustments” it refers to should be understood. 
Indeed, not once does it mention the term ‘retrogressive measures’. The question is thus 
whether the adjustments referred to should be understood as retrogressive measures in 
terms of article 2(1) or as limitations in terms article 4?172  Subsequent practice by the 
Committee would imply the former; in its 2017 concluding observation to Sri Lanka, for 
instance, it expressly stated that retrogressive measures may be justified, provided they 
meet the criteria of the 2012 letter.173 The repeated failure by the Committee to spell out 
the nature of the measures it is referring to, would nevertheless suggest that there is room 
for interpretation when considering the relationship between retrogressive measures and 
limitations. 
 
 
Considering the apparent importance of the 2012 letter, as examined above, the four 
criteria laid down it – temporariness, necessity and proportionality, non-discrimination, 
and the protection of the minimum core – will be examined in the following chapter. 
 
 
3.3. Assessing non-retrogression in light of the 2012 letter 
 
3.3.1. The criterion of temporariness 
 
According to the first criterion of the 2012 letter, any “proposed policy change or 
adjustment” must be ‘temporary’. In accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word, 
retrogressive measures should thus last for a “limited period of time”.174 The Committee 
has moreover stated that such measures should only cover the “period of the crisis”.175 
 
 
 
171 CESCR, Djazia and Bellini v Spain, para. 17.6. 
172 See further, chapter 5.1. 
173 CESCR, concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Sri Lanka, 4 August 2017, 
E/C.12/LKA/CO/5, para 22, stating that “Any retrogression measures are acceptable under exceptional 
circumstances of economic hardship, providing, however, that they are temporary, non-discriminatory, 
proportional and do not affect disadvantaged and marginalized persons and groups”. 
174 Oxford English Dictionary, temporary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/temporary  (last 
accessed 8.10.2019). 
175 Letter dated 16 May 2012. 
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However, since it is difficult to strictly define the beginning, and even less the end of a 
crisis, the notion does little to provide guidance on the actual period of time retrogressive 
measures might be considered justifiable. Nevertheless, given the Committees acceptance 
of retrogressive measures in times of resource scarcity, one could argue that the duration 
of a retrogressive measure could be considered acceptable, as long as it ceases by the time 
resources continue to increase. As many particularly war-torn states suffer from a lack of 
available resources for years – or even decades – such an understanding does not, 
however, seem to be in line with the understanding that retrogressive measures should 
last only for a ‘limited period of time’. 
 
 
Although the exact definition of the requirement of temporariness may be questioned, it 
has nevertheless been applied by the Committee in a wide range of concluding 
observations, particularly in relation to post-crisis austerity related policy adjustments. 
For instance, in its 2018 concluding observation on Spain, the Committee expressly 
criticized the regressive effects of a law limiting the quality of and access to health-care 
services by irregular migrants, inter alia, since it was not considered temporary.176 
Similarly, in relation to South Africa, the Committee expressed its concern over the fact 
that the State Party had introduced austerity measures without defining when such 
measures would be re-examined or lifted.177 Temporariness has similarly been considered 
by a number of domestic courts, for instance the Constitutional Courts of Latvia and 
Portugal.178  According to the latter, retrogressive measures have been held to meet the 
requirement of temporariness, when imposed for a specific duration at a time.179 
 
 
The question of duration is made more complex by the possibility to differentiate between 
the temporariness of an actual measure on the one hand, and the temporariness of its 
impacts on the other. Concerning the latter, it is beyond doubt that the austerity measures 
 
 
 
176 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Spain, 25 April 2018, 
E/C.12/ESP/CO/6, paras. 41,42. 
177 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the initial report of South Africa, 19 November 2018, 
E/C.12/ZAF/CO/1, para. 18. 
178 See e.g., Constitutional Court of Latvia, 21 December 2009, Case No. 2009–43–01, para. 32, 
Constitutional Court of Portugal, 5 April 2013, Judgement No 187/2013 (Portugese Budget Law Case), 
See further Kirvesniemi, 2015, pp. 23-27. 
179 In the Portugese Budget Law Case the duration at hand was one year. See English summary, chapter 3: 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/acordaos/20130187s.html (last accessed 8.10.2019). 
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of the 2007-2008 economic and financial crisis have resulted in long-term adverse human 
rights impacts in a number of European countries, for instance by way of a sustained 
youth unemployment, potentially impacting the future economic opportunities of young 
people for a significant amount of time.180 As it would seem extremely difficult to 
measure the de facto temporariness of the human rights impacts of retrogressive 
measures, it may be presumed that the Committee, by stating that the policy must be a 
temporary measure, is referring to the actual measures taken instead of their impacts. 
Nevertheless, considering that even short-term decisions may have significantly 
detrimental, even fatal, effects on people – for instance in relation to people suffering 
from HIV/AIDS when support for essential medicines is reduced – it has been argued the 
notion of temporariness should be understood by both nature and effect.181 
 
 
The question of whether a retrogressive measure will remain temporary or become 
entrenched may furthermore be influenced by whether the measure in question is based 
on legislative or structural reforms, compared to policy or budgetary amendments of a 
more temporary nature. For instance, after the economic and financial crisis some 
governments chose to enact permanent ceilings on their public deficit. While aiming to 
reduce borrowing costs, such decisions limited the possibility of future governments to 
institute economic revival measures, necessary to mitigate the adverse human rights 
impacts of economic recessions.182 
 
 
Since the Committee has not purported to define the content and scope of temporariness, 
it may be helpful to look at the jurisprudence of other human rights bodies. Indeed, 
guidance may be drawn from jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as 
well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which have considered the notion 
of temporariness in relation to derogations. In particular, while neither the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),183 nor the ICCPR expressly require derogations 
to be temporary, the HRC has asserted in General Comment No. 29 that measures 
 
 
 
180 Lusiani, 2016, p. 225. 
181 Nolan et. al, 2014, p. 140. 
182 Lusiani, 2016, p. 224. 
183 European Convention on Human Rights, formally: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR), 4 November 1950, ETS No. 005. 
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derogating from the ICCPR “must be of an exceptional and temporary nature”.184  The 
ECtHR, however, has held that while the duration of measures derogating from the ECHR 
may be relevant for assessing the proportionality of such measures in relation to article 
15 of the ECHR, they do not have to be of a fixed duration.185 Rather, the approach of the 
ECtHR has been understood to imply that the emergency measures must be lifted by the 
time the ‘life of the nation’ disappears,186  or the measures taken are no longer strictly 
necessary or proportional to address the threat.187 This would support the view put 
forward above, according to which the acceptable duration of retrogressive measures 
should not be measured against the “temporariness” of the measures per se but rather in 
relation to when available resources begin to increase. Alternatively, therefore, instead of 
looking at the temporariness rule in a vacuum, the Committee could assess the duration 
of a retrogressive measure as one factor relating to the necessity and proportionality of 
the measures. These will be examined to the following. 
 
 
3.3.2. The criterion of necessity and proportionality 
 
Indeed, the second criterion laid down by the 2012 letter requires that any retrogressive 
measure be necessary and proportionate, “in the sense that the adoption of any other 
policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social and cultural 
rights”.188 Proportionality may generally be held to express the view that “the graver the 
impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the 
justification that will be required”.189 Understood as the final stage of the proportionality 
analysis, the principle of proportionality will be examined more closely in chapter 4 in 
relation to the Committee’s adjudication of negative obligations. The present chapter will 
thus focus on the requirement of necessity – the test of whether less intrusive but equally 
effective means would have been available to the state.190 
 
 
 
 
 
184 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 2. 
185 European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), Complaint No. 3455/05, A & Others v. United 
Kingdom, judgement of 19 February 2009, para. 178. 
186 ECHR, article 15. 
187 Criddle, 2014, p. 205. 
188 Letter dated 16 May 2012. 
189 See e.g. Taggart, 2008, p. 423. 
190 See e.g. Alexy 2002 pp. 66-69, Kumm, 2007, pp. 131, 138-139. 
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The necessity of retrogressive measures has been considered by the ECSR in its decision 
IKA-ETAM c. Greece. The case concerned severe austerity measures made by Greece in 
relation to social security benefits, as part of a bailout agreement made with the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission 
(The Troika).191    In it, the ECSR accepted that reductions to social benefits could be 
compatible with article 12(3) ESC, provided they were necessary for the maintenance of 
the social security scheme in times of economic hardship.192    While recognizing the 
economic crisis faced by Greece, it stated that the Greek government had not conducted 
a necessary level of research into the adverse impacts of its measures, particularly on 
disadvantaged groups of society.193 Accordingly, Greece had not made careful 
consideration of all alternatives.194  Similarly, the CESCR has noted that retrogressive 
measures may be introduced only after “the most careful consideration of all 
alternatives”.195  Moreover, according to the 2007 statement examined earlier, the 
Committee may assess whether the State Party has adopted the least restrictive 
alternative.196   It may thus be concluded that a State Party, in order to comply with the 
requirement of necessity, and hence to demonstrate that it has considered all alternatives 
(and potentially chosen the least restrictive one), is under an obligation to conduct an 
adequate human rights impact assessment prior to introducing retrogressive measures.197 
 
 
Moreover, the criterion of necessity may be understood to require a State Party to 
demonstrate that it has taken steps “to the maximum of its available resources”,198 in order 
to progressively realize the Covenant rights.199  States are thus under an obligation not 
only to administer existing resources, but also to mobilize new ones.200 The obligation to 
mobilize resources is closely linked with the concept of non-retrogression, since states 
 
191 ECSR, Federation of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v. Greece (hereinafter IKA-ETAM 
v. Greece), Complaint No. 76/2012, decision on the merits, 7 December 2012. 
192 ESCR, IKA-ETAM v. Greece, para 71. 
193 Ibid., It thus held that the cumulative effects of the restrictions were bound to bring about a 
“significant degradation of the standard of living and the living conditions of many of the pensioners 
concerned”, paras. 78-79. 
194 Ibid., para. 80. 
195 CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 42. 
196 CESCR, 2007 statement, para. 8 (d). 
197 See further, Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Impact Assessment of Economic Reforms, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/40/57, 2018. 
198 ICESCR, article 2(1). 
199 Lusiani, 2014, p. 220. 
200 Balakrishnan & Heinz, 2016, p. 21. 
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may be inclined to invoke the lack of available resources as justification for retrogression. 
As described by Balakrishnan and Heinz, there are five main areas that affect the 
resources potentially available to the state: government expenditure; government 
revenue; development assistance, debt and deficit financing; and, monetary policies and 
financial regulation.201 The above thus obliges states to take positive action, inter alia by 
developing fiscal policies capable of generating sufficient revenue for the realization of 
human rights.202 
 
 
Human rights-oriented fiscal policies are thus imperative to offset contradictions in public 
revenue in circumstances under which available resources are limited, for instance during 
an economic crisis. This may be evidenced by several Concluding Observations such as 
the 2017 review on Sri Lanka, in which the Committee expressed its concern about the 
fact that the fiscal revenue of Sri Lanka had diminished as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product (GDP).203  It further commented upon the low level of public 
expenditure in relation to social protection programs, as well as the significant budgetary 
cuts made in relation to education and health care. The Committee thus expressed concern 
about such conduct amounting to unjustifiable retrogression, since it did not meet all the 
criteria laid down in the 2012 letter. While the Committee did not expressly state which 
criterion it referred to, the fact that the above was stated under the title “progressive 
realization and maximum available resources” points towards the fact that by not 
incorporating a human rights-centred fiscal strategy, the state party had failed to justify 
the ‘necessity’ of its retrogressive measures.204 
 
 
Since the criterion of necessity and proportionality raise questions of resource allocation, 
competing schools of thought will in turn be invoked, as discussed earlier. Reiterating the 
fact that the Covenant does not dictate any particular form of government or economic 
system, states are left with a margin of discretion to decide upon which measures they 
 
 
 
201 Ibid., 2016, p. 60. 
202 Balakrishnan & Heinz, 2016, p. 60. However, despite their legal obligations under the ICESCR and 
the ESCR, many European states, for instance, have shown reluctance to redistributing income through 
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203 CESCR, concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Sri Lanka, 2017, paras. 22-11. 
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deem appropriate.205 Needless to say, evaluating whether maximum available resources 
have been used in order to necessitate retrogressive measures, is not an easy task for the 
Committee. Importantly, however, it has noted that “the ultimate determination as to 
whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one for the Committee to 
make”.206 In determining the ‘appropriateness’ of whatever measures adopted by the 
state, the Committee will assess their effectiveness in realizing the Covenant rights. 207 
Thus, in addition to assessing whether adequate resources have been generated and 
allocated for the realization of ESC rights, the Committee may also look at whether such 
resources have been effectively and efficiently spent.208  Such considerations are 
influenced by various factors, such as whether steps have been taken against tax evasion 
and corruption,209  and whether resources devoted to the realization of ESC rights have 
actually been used for said purpose and not diverted for other purposes.210 
 
 
3.3.3. The criterion of non-discrimination 
 
The third criterion laid down by the 2012 letter prohibits retrogressive measures that are 
deemed either directly or indirectly discriminatory. State Parties are obliged under article 
2(2) of the Covenant to ensure that Covenant rights are exercised without discrimination 
of any kind based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The latter ground confirms that 
the list of prohibited grounds is not exhaustive, thus allowing for the inclusion of other 
comparable grounds. The Committee has defined discrimination as follows: 
 
 
…any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is 
directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the 
intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of Covenant rights.211 
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Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, on taxation and human rights, 22 May 2014, Un doc. A/HRC/26/28. See 
further, Balakrishnan & Heinz, 2016, p. 62. 
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The above implies that states should not only ensure the removal of discrimination from 
their constitutions, legislation and other policy documents, but also to actively address 
substantive discrimination.212  Greater resources should thus be directed to groups that 
have traditionally faced marginalization and are thus subject to systemic 
discrimination.213 Indeed, the Chairperson of the Committee emphasized in the 2012 
letter that all state policies must be non-discriminatory and support the mitigation of 
inequalities, prone to grow during times crisis. Particular attention should moreover be 
accorded to disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups in order to ensure 
that they are not disproportionately affected. 214  The same has been reiterated by the 
Committee in a number of subsequent concluding observations.215  States should 
moreover ensure that any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the provision of 
certain public services do not have disproportionate impacts on women. Limiting the 
provision of key infrastructure such as energy, water and sanitation facilities, for instance, 
are deemed to have severe impacts on women and girls, often responsible for household 
chores and caring of infants and elderly.216 
 
 
In contrast, it may be argued that retrogressive measures are justifiable when aiming to 
ensure the rights of disadvantaged groups. Indeed, the Committee has indicated that 
retrogression might be justified in order to direct resources towards the implementation 
of a general policy or emergency plan when seeking to progressively realize rights 
“especially for persons in a particularly vulnerable situation”.217 The criteria of necessity 
and non-discrimination are thus closely intertwined. 
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3.3.4. The criterion of identifying and protecting the minimum core content of rights 
According to the final criterion of the letter, a proposed policy change must “identify the 
minimum core content of rights…and ensure the protection of this core content at all 
times.”218  According to the concept of the minimum core content of rights, states are 
obliged to ensure minimum essential levels of each of the rights set forth by the Covenant. 
The concept was expressed already by the 1987 Limburg Principles, according to which 
“[s]tates parties are obligated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure 
respect for minimum subsistence rights for all”.219 The same idea has been expressed by 
the Committee on several occasions, albeit in shifting forms. Indeed, the Committee has 
variously presented the minimum core as either a prioritization-related principle or as a 
non-derogable legal obligation.220 The content of the minimum core – and how it should 
be interpreted to guide states in issuing retrogressive measures – thus remains murky. 
 
 
 
While the Committee referred to the minimum core already in General Comment No. 3, 
it did not, however, include any reference to it in the Optional Protocol. Rather, it opted 
for the so-called reasonableness review, discussed more in detail in following chapters. 
The question is therefore, how, or whether, the minimum core marries with the 
reasonableness review. In accordance with later expressions of the Committee,221 as well 
as commentators,222 it may be assumed that the minimum core should generally not be 
interpreted in absolute terms: even states failing to ensure minimum levels of enjoyment 
may attribute such failure to the lack of resources by demonstrating that “every effort has 
been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter 
of priority, those minimum obligations.”223 Accordingly, should a state be able to 
convincingly explain its inability to attain a minimum level of a right, even after having 
consulted international assistance,224 it may be presumed to have complied with its 
obligations under the Covenant. 
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Careful not to pronounce itself in absolute terms, the same approach would appear to have 
been adopted by the Committee in its recent jurisprudence. Indeed, in its to date sole case 
on non-retrogression, Djazia and Bellini v. Spain, the Committee noted that non- 
fulfilment would be possible to justify provided that all necessary steps would have been 
taken, to the maximum of their available resources.225 In it, the Committee had to 
determine whether the eviction of the authors and their two minor children from their 
private rental accommodation, in light of the authorities’ failure to grant alternative 
housing and thus rendering the authors homeless, amounted to a violation of their right 
to adequate housing. Such a failure was considered to be a prima facie violation of the 
right at hand, particularly due to the lack of legislation allowing judges to consider the 
compatibility of an eviction with the Covenant or to suspend an eviction order before 
alternative accommodation was found.226 Spain had moreover resorted to retrogression 
by selling part of its public housing stock to private investment companies, thus reducing 
the availability of housing in the middle of a severe housing crisis.227 
 
The burden was thereby shifted to the state to prove that it had been unable to uphold the 
right to adequate housing despite having taken all necessary measures to the maximum 
of its available resources.228 Due to the inability of Spain to explain why the denial of the 
authors’ social housing was necessary – for instance due to a need of redirecting its 
resources towards the progressive realization of the right to housing of particularly 
marginalized persons – the Committee did not find its measures justified.229 Importantly, 
by stating that the denial of alternative housing would not have been prohibited, had it 
been compelled to do so in order to progressively realize the rights of particularly 
vulnerable individuals, the Committee thus effectively rejected any absolutist form of the 
minimum core. It should moreover be noted that the Committee, in referring to the 2012- 
letter, stated the following: “in times of severe economic and financial crisis, all 
budgetary  changes  or  adjustments  affecting  policies  must be temporary,  necessary, 
 
 
 
 
225 CESCR, Djazia and Bellini v. Spain, para. 17.5. 
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proportional and non-discriminatory”.230 Notably therefore, the Committee referred to all 
criteria, except the requirement to identify and protect the minimum core content of 
rights. 
 
It may thus be concluded that the concept of the minimum core is better viewed as a tool 
for priority-setting, in which the needs of marginalized individuals and groups should be 
prioritized, rather than an absolute bar against retrogressive measures.231 Moreover, due 
to the failure by the Committee to define the actual meaning of the criteria as delineated 
above, and hence the difficulties in determining their normative content and scope, a 
better view would be to review them as factors informing the overall assessment of the 
reasonableness of the steps taken. Before turning to the question of the judicial 
enforcement of the Covenant rights, it is first worth to examine the viewpoint in light of 
which retrogressive measures should be assessed. 
 
3.4. Assessing retrogression in relation to a particular claimant or in relation to the 
population as a whole 
 
As noted by Liebenberg, one of the greatest difficulties with assessing non-retrogression 
is whether compatibility should be examined in relation to a particular claimant or groups 
of claimants, or in relation to the population as a whole.232 If the former interpretation is 
applied, it would mean that the state is under an obligation to justify any retrogression 
taken in relation to a particular individual or group of individuals, regardless of whether 
the state can demonstrate an increase in the overall enjoyment of the rights under 
assessment in respect of the entire population. In contrast, if the latter interpretation is 
applied, the state would not be obliged to justify a reduction provided it would be able to 
demonstrate an overall improvement in access to the rights assessed in relation to the 
population as a whole. In other words, the state would not need to justify retrogressive 
measures taken in relation to any particular individual or group of individuals, provided 
that the overall access to benefits would not have decreased.233 
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The latter interpretation was adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR) in its judgement in the case of Five Pensioners v. Peru, in which the Court had 
to consider whether the state of Peru had violated the right to social security of the five 
litigants by reducing their pensions.234 Ruling in favour of the pensioners, the Court found 
a violation of the right to property and to judicial protection under articles 21 and 25 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court nevertheless declined to rule on 
the right to progressive development of economic, social and cultural rights under article 
26 of the Convention. According to the Court: 
 
 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights have both an individual and a collective dimension. This Court 
considers that their progressive development, about which the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has already ruled, should be measured in function of the 
growing coverage of economic, social and cultural rights in general, and of the right to social 
security and to a pension in particular, of the entire population, bearing in mind the imperatives of 
social equity, and not in function of the circumstances of a very limited group of pensioners, who 
do not necessarily represent the prevailing situation.235 
 
 
In terms of rejecting the request to rule on article 26, the IACHR thus adopted the 
collective interpretation of non-retrogression by not requiring Peru to justify the 
reductions made in relation to the particular five pensioners. As noted above, such a 
requirement (if examining non-retrogression in terms of the population as a whole) is 
conditioned by evidence that the overall access to pensions would have reduced. 
According to the IACHR it was “evident” that the pensioners did not “represent the 
prevailing situation…in the instant case”.236  The court thus effectively precluded 
individuals from raising complaints against alleged violations of their socioeconomic 
rights under article 26, unless able to prove harm not only to themselves, but at least to 
some extent to the population as whole. As noted by Melish, the court thus seemed to 
“subordinate the individual as a rights titulaire, entirely to the sum of the population”.237 
Although the five litigants belonged to advantaged groups of society and had 
disproportionately high pensions (amounting to 3500 US dollars in comparison to the 
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average Peruvian monthly income of 175 US dollars) – and while this should without 
doubt have been considered at the merits stage – it should not have affected their standing. 
Indeed, all human rights – whether civil, cultural, economic, political or social – belong 
equally to everyone, regardless of socioeconomic status. 
 
 
Focusing entirely on the sum of the population over the individual rights-holder, would 
thus seem to obscure the entire purpose of human rights; the well-being and dignity of all 
individuals.238 Of this follows, that assessing the compatibility of retrogressive measures 
would arguably have to be made in relation to an individual or groups of individuals, 
rather than in relation to the population in its entirety. This appears to be supported by the 
observation of the SACC in Grootboom, noting that a statistical advance in the realization 
of socioeconomic right will not be considered sufficient in meeting the test of 
reasonableness, if the state fails to treat everyone with care and concern.239 
 
 
As will be demonstrated below, however, one of the main concerns with the enforcement 
of non-retrogression in relation to individual litigants are the distributive effects linked 
therein; by way of strengthening the access to benefits by the more advantaged, courts 
simultaneously risk obstructing governments’ broader aims of achieving a more equitable 
distribution of resources.240 It is thus worth examining the broader questions of judicial 
enforcement and issues of distributive justice linked therein. 
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4. The judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights 
 
4.1. A typology of court postures 
 
Before addressing how the Committee should adjudicate retrogression-related complaints 
under the Optional Protocol, it is useful to consider the various approaches, or postures, 
courts may have in relation to social rights adjudication in general. Such postures are 
described by Tushnet in his categorization of “strong” and “weak” courts, and the forms 
of judicial review linked to them.241  It should be noted that the terms ‘judicial review’ 
and ‘standard of review’ essentially refer to two distinct, albeit interrelated, processes; 
whereas the former refers to the process through which courts determine whether the 
actions by the executive or legislature conform with the constitution, the latter refers to 
the degree of deference allowed by courts when reviewing a decision of a lower court (or 
the state in the context of an international judicial or quasi-judicial body, such as the 
Committee). The lessons learned from the theory on strong-form and weak-form judicial 
review is nevertheless important in the context of the present thesis since, I argue, it 
provides for valuable insight into how the Committee should purport to apply the 
reasonableness standard of review when adjudicating retrogression-related complaints 
under the Optional Protocol. 
 
 
Whereas strong courts are argued by Tushnet to operate with structured and rule-like 
standards, strict scrutiny and far-reaching remedies, weak courts are argued to be 
accompanied by contextualized standards, relaxed scrutiny – and if liability is found – 
relatively weak remedies. 242   Rather counterintuitively, perhaps, it is argued by Tushnet 
that social rights are better enforced and protected through weak-form judicial review. 
This, particularly since muscular pronouncements may risk reinforcing the critique 
against the justiciability of socioeconomic rights. The pattern may be described as a 
separation of powers issue:  the legislative and executive branches of the state may feel 
threatened, and thereby wish to replace the sitting judges or otherwise to limit the powers 
of the court.243 Accordingly, and as noted by Nonet and Selznik, proactive adjudication 
may undermine the legitimacy of the court, spark counter-reactions or even backlashes.244 
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Excessive strength might therefore threaten the very interests that the courts aim to 
protect. Weaker forms of judicial review, on the other hand, are held to enhance the ability 
of courts to protect rights, while simultaneously allowing the elected branches to have the 
greatest decision-making power.245 
 
 
Being mindful of the risks associated with strong-form judicial review (or, in the case of 
the Committee, rigid standards of review) is particularly important in relation to the 
adjudication of retrogression-related complaints. This, especially when considering the 
context in which retrogressive measures are usually adjudicated; in times of economic 
distress when structural adjustments are often deemed necessary. Needless to say, such 
legislative decisions may be highly unpopular with the public, whereby courts may feel 
tempted to strike down attempted government reforms. As stated above, however, an 
excessively pro-active enforcement of socioeconomic rights by way of applying strict 
standards may risk being short-lived; this, since the other branches of the state may wish 
to alter judicial behaviour through the appointment process, if not by more drastic 
measures, if pushed to its limits.246 
 
 
In the context of the Committee, the application of rigid standards of review (particularly 
in relation to positive obligations, typically perceived as more encroaching upon the 
powers of the elected branches) might similarly impact the nomination of candidates by 
State Parties.247 More importantly, however, any perceived concerns over the illegitimacy 
of the Committee might stagnate the ratification of the Optional Protocol. 248 Moreover, 
concerns of illegitimacy might impact the degree to which State Parties feel compelled to 
follow the (non-binding) views of the Committee. Hence, from the viewpoint of enforcing 
socioeconomic rights – particularly in relation to the adjudication of retrogression-related 
complaints – it would appear to be beneficial to favour less absolutist standards of review. 
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More recent studies tend to focus not only on the weak/strong dichotomy, but also on the 
impact of the interaction between courts and other state and non-state actors on the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights.249 Langford, for instance, argues that a responsive 
court can avoid the uncertainties linked to its institutional competence by way of being 
“reflexively mindful of its relationship with other actors”.250 This could be achieved by 
allowing or requesting amicus curiae submissions and developing new, innovative 
processes for gathering evidence.251 Beyond concerns linked to the separation of powers 
doctrine, strong forms of review may risk leading to a middle-class bias. This, because of 
the relative advantage of higher-income groups in gaining access to judicial processes,252 
and because budgetary decisions by courts may unable the other branches of the state to 
redirect resources to individuals and groups of individuals in more dire need. The question 
of distributive justice linked to the enforcement of socioeconomic rights is thus worth 
further examination. 
 
 
4.2. The judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights and distributive justice 
 
With the establishment of an international complaint mechanism for the protection of 
socioeconomic rights, hopes were raised for a more socially just society. As stated by 
former justice of the Canadian Supreme Court Louise Arbor “[t]he possibility for people 
themselves to claim their human rights entitlements through legal processes is essential 
so that human rights have meaning for those most at the margins”.253 While it is suggested 
that the main purpose of socioeconomic rights is to raise the economic status of the 
poorest and most marginalized members of society, empirical literature nevertheless 
points towards a gap between theory and practice.254  It has namely been shown that 
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socioeconomic rights are often enforced without “focusing exclusively, or even primarily, 
on the marginalized.”255 
 
 
Case study evidence drawn from national contexts may serve to illustrate this point. In 
Brazil, for instance, courts have typically been reticent towards addressing collective 
claims, instead focusing on individual actions.256 This tendency is particularly notable in 
relation to health right cases concerning the access to medicines and medical treatment.257 
Similar patterns have been argued to exist in other Latin American states, for instance 
Colombia258 and Costa Rica.259 The cautious approach towards collective claims is 
believed to be motivated by concerns of institutional capacity and legitimacy, by courts 
not  wanting  to  appear  as  if  trying  to  influence  public  policy  decision-making.260 
Arguably, this practice risks leading to a twofold asymmetry: first, by granting individual 
claims standing relatively easier than collective ones, and second, by stressing the 
absolute character of the right to health when adjudicated in relation to individual claims 
(as compared to collective claims).261 Consequently, some scholars claim that the main 
beneficiaries of the socioeconomic rights enforcement in Brazil belong to the middle 
class.262 As Ferraz notes: 
 
 
Rather than enhancing the provision of health benefits that are badly needed by the most 
disadvantaged – such as basic sanitation, reasonable access to primary health care, and 
vaccination programs – this model diverts essential resources of the health budget to the funding 
of mostly high cost drugs claimed by individuals who are already privileged in terms of health 
conditions and services263 
 
 
Other scholars nevertheless argue that the risks of social rights litigation may at times be 
overstated. In particular, while the enforcement of socioeconomic rights is undoubtedly 
challenged by distributive bias, there are significant variances across countries and across 
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time.264  It is moreover noted that the causal relationship between judicial enforcement 
orders and the social outcomes they lead to might not always be linear; while they are 
directed towards higher income groups they may benefit disadvantaged groups 
indirectly.265 Langford also points to the fact that determining whether social rights 
adjudication leads to inequality is conditioned by what is understood by the very concept 
of equality; in one end of the spectrum are those scholars who support radical equality, 
of whom the most notable advocate is arguably Ferraz. By criticizing the Brazilian 
judiciary for granting access to medical treatment to privileged groups of society, he 
argues that that the courts should direct all enforcement of socioeconomic rights to the 
disadvantaged.266 In the other end are those according to which adjudication should 
enable equal capabilities for all, even though disadvantaged groups might gain less 
overall.267 
 
 
Despite the supposed transformative purpose of socioeconomic rights enforcement, the 
most radical theories of redistributive justice might nevertheless be too extreme: as noted 
by Langford the radical equality demand “risks ignoring the moderately poor, the working 
poor and the vulnerable working/middle class – even Marx did not ascribe to it”268 More 
moderate theories, benefitting not only the most disadvantaged but also other groups of 
society, might thus be warranted. For example, social welfare regimes in the Nordic 
countries build upon o “social contract” between different groups of society.269 Whereas 
the middle class pay higher levels of taxes, they mutually benefit from the running of 
efficient social services. Indeed, by excluding the middle class from the adjudication of 
socioeconomic rights, courts may risk losing their political legitimacy.270 
 
 
Similarly, while the establishment of the Optional Protocol raised hopes for a more 
socially just society, it simultaneously raised questions relating to distributive justice. 
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Such concerns have been particularly pertinent in relation to the concept of non- 
retrogression. This may be explained by the frequent application by courts of negative 
injunction, i.e. the striking down of laws rather than issuing positive orders, in relation to 
the enforcement of socioeconomic rights.271  By applying negative injunction, the 
judiciary does not have to examine questions of budgetary allocations or order the state 
to conform to a certain policy – merely, it has to assess whether the measures adopted 
were compatible with the Covenant. Since the judiciary does not have to address 
questions traditionally linked to the other branches of the state, negative injunction is 
perceived as relatively “court like”, and thus preferred by judges.272 
 
 
In light of the above, it may be concluded that judges are drawn towards the enforcement 
of individual claims, and claims involving negative obligations. In the context of the 
ICESRC, such a finding indicates that the Committee would be relatively more 
comfortable in finding a violation of retrogression-related complaints (involving active 
state interferences) compared to other complaints. This is problematic when considering 
that the middle and high income groups of society generally enjoy greater access to e.g. 
pensions and health care benefits, whereas the poorest groups only have a few, if any, 
benefits to cut from in the first place.273 In times of economic distress, governments may 
thus feel compelled to reduce the benefits received by relatively advantageous 
individuals, in order to urgently reduce budget deficits or to redistribute resources to those 
in more urgent need. An overly rigid interpretation of the concept of non-retrogression 
might thus halt necessary government reforms, whereby the main beneficiaries remain 
far from those “most at the margins” as hoped for by justice Arbor. 
 
 
In order to avoid the risks relating to distributive justice when adjudicating socioeconomic 
rights in general, and retrogression-related complaints in particular, the standard of 
review applied by the Committee may play a pivotal role. The underlying factors 
impacting the choice of review standards will thus be examined to the following. 
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4.3. Underlying factors informing the choice and application of review standards 
The choice of review standard by courts and quasi-judicial bodies is impacted by several 
underlying factors. In some instances, however, the liberty of choice may be limited by 
an express provision, mandating the applicable standard of review. The manner in which 
such express standards are applied may nevertheless be influenced by how the directives 
contained in the relevant provision are interpreted in a particular context. Accordingly, 
while  the  Committee  is   mandated   to   review   communications   in   light  of   the 
reasonableness review set in article 8 (4) of the Optional Protocol, the effectiveness and 
potential of the provision is greatly influenced by how the Committee chooses to apply 
the provision in a given communication.274 The underlying factors informing the choice 
of review, and the application of an express standard in a specific case, is thus worth 
further examination. 
 
 
The first factor impacting the choice and application of a standard of review, is the nature 
of the obligation under scrutiny; indeed, as noted earlier, courts are usually drawn towards 
stronger forms of review when confronted with negative as opposed to positive 
obligations. Indeed, the adjudication of complaints involving an active state interference 
depriving individuals of their existing access to socioeconomic rights is often perceived 
as less encroaching upon the powers of the democratically elected branches.275 This, 
because it merely requires the court to assess whether the interference is justifiable, rather 
than to prescribe the state on matters of social and economic policy.276 
 
 
The above tendency may be illustrated by the decision of the SACC in Jaftha, involving 
the deprivation of access to adequate housing.277 In it, the court stated that “any measure 
which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing” would be 
a limitation of the right to adequate housing.278 In contrast to its previous case law, solely 
concerned with positive obligations, in Jaftha, the court adopted a distinctive model of 
review in relation to interferences of the duty to respect. Indeed, instead of considering 
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the notions of reasonableness, resource constraints or progressive realization under 
section 26(2), as with previous cases, the court went on to consider the interference under 
the general limitations clause as set forth in section 36, thus subjecting the interference to 
close scrutiny.279 
 
 
The decision in Jaftha thus demonstrates that the SACC will apply a different approach 
when confronted with a state interference depriving people of their existing access to 
socioeconomic rights, in contrast to when confronted with an failure by states to protect 
or fulfil rights.280 Whereas interferences are subjected to a strict standard of review under 
the general limitations clause, omissions are evaluated through a relatively lenient form 
of review by allowing states a greater margin to rely on progressive realization within 
available resources. While this distinction may be warranted in respect of the separation 
of powers doctrine as noted above, it may nevertheless be problematic in terms of other 
considerations. As argued by Liebenberg: 
 
 
The stronger model of review applied to negative as opposed to positive duties suggest that in 
circumstances where people lack access to socio-economic resources and services, the State 
will be exposed to less robust forms of constitutional accountability.281 
 
 
Accordingly, by subjecting interferences to a more stringent form of review than 
omissions, the above approach would seem to benefit individuals with prior access to 
socioeconomic rights, as opposed to individuals who lack access to said rights. Such an 
understanding would seem to conflict with the object and purpose of the ICESCR (i.e the 
establishment of clear obligations for State Parties, in order to achieve the full realization 
of socioeconomic rights),282 particularly since, as noted above, most social rights are 
enjoyed by relatively advantaged groups of society. Arguably, the Covenant’s object and 
purpose should not be understood solely in respect of a broader access to the rights by a 
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few, but also in respect of a broader number and wider range of beneficiaries.283 The first 
concern thus relates to considerations of social justice. 
 
 
A second concern relates to the (at least partly) artificial conceptual division between 
positive duties on the one hand and negative duties on the other. As discussed in chapter 
two, violations of socioeconomic rights often involve features of both infringements and 
omissions. Indeed, while the duty to respect will in most cases entail an obligation to 
refrain from taking certain action, it may also entail a positive obligation to ensure access 
to existing rights. The negative obligation not to interfere with the right to adequate 
housing, for example, is simultaneously linked to the positive obligation to provide 
alternative accommodation in the face of homelessness resulted by an eviction. Certain 
infringements may thus be framed both in terms of a negative duty not to interfere, and 
in terms of a positive duty by way of not taking a certain course of conduct.284 
 
 
The third and final concern relates to the conception that refraining from action would 
require less from the state than actively pursuing to protect and fulfil socioeconomic 
rights, and thus be less restraining upon the other branches of the state. As noted by Koch, 
this might not be fully correct: 
 
 
For example, the interest of a State party in obtaining ownership of a certain residential property 
may be so great that the costs connected with abstaining from expropriation, i.e. showing respect 
for the right to private property exceeds those of fulfilling the right to housing by providing 
accommodation to the person or persons who becomes homeless as a consequence of the 
expropriation.285 
 
 
The cost implications of non-interference may thus be substantial. This might be 
particularly true in relation to the concept of non-retrogression, where non-interference 
in the existing access to rights of some may incur significant costs for the state, thus 
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number of people but to a wider range of people as time progresses”. 
284 In CCSA, Grootboom, for instance, the circumstances could arguably have been framed so as to have 
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the state to protect the litigants’ rights to housing. 
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halting its potential endeavours to progressively develop the rights of others. 286 Since the 
framing of a case as involving either a positive or a negative duty may be the result of a 
rather arbitrary process – in combination with concerns relating to social justice and 
misconceptions relating to the cost implications of non-interference as per above – the 
choice of standard of review depending on the nature of the obligation, can only be partly 
correct. Other explanations are thus worth mentioning. 
 
 
The second explanation behind the choice of review standards (and the application of 
provisions setting out express standards of review) relates to the maturity of the court; 
whereas courts with a less experienced jurisprudence tend to adopt deferential forms, 
more mature courts opt for more interventionist ones.287 This would seem to concede with 
Tushnet’s argument according to which weak courts tend to strengthen over time (and 
then reconvert back to weak ones).288 
 
 
The third explanation relates to the nature of the relevant right. According to this view, a 
stronger form of review would be applicable to more measurable rights and objectives 
relating to commodities, such as food or water, whereas inherently complex rights and 
objectives, such as the right to health, would be subjected to weaker forms of review.289 
 
 
Fourth, it has been argued that a stronger form of review would be more appropriate in 
cases where the court order entails insignificant cost implications for the state.290 Such an 
explanation would seem to concede with the separation of powers argument, and cost- 
related objections by states in relation to the enforcement of socioeconomic rights 
compared to other rights. As discussed in the first chapter, however, assessing the 
empirical effects and costs of court decisions in the long term is not an easy endeavour. 
 
 
The final factor impacting the choice and application of review standards is argued to be 
the seriousness of the infringement or omission at hand. In relation to proportionality 
analysis under the general limitations clause, Rivers argues that the intensity of the review 
 
286 See e.g., IACHR, Five Pensioners v. Peru, as discussed in chapter 3.4. 
287 Young, 2010, p. 414. 
288 Tushnet, 2008, p. 43. 
289 Young, 2010, p. 415. 
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should be shifted in accordance with the seriousness of the infringement.291 The question 
is, however, how one should define and determine seriousness? Here various options are 
available: on the one hand, seriousness could be measured in light of human dignity, 
equality and freedom, whereby the judicial body in question would most likely enter into 
a searching inquiry in order to strike a fair balance between interests of the rights-holder 
and the community as a whole. On the other hand, seriousness could be measured in terms 
of e.g. property-based rights, as a result of which the complaint would arguably be 
interpreted generously in favour of the individual. 292 Since such right are often perceived 
as more cognizable and “court-like” than concepts of human dignity and social justice, it 
appears likely that seriousness would be measured in light of, for instance, property-based 
considerations.293 Such a finding is important since, as illustrated by the Latin American 
examples, an individual-centric enforcement of rights may risk entrenching the status quo 
by favouring more advantaged groups of society. 
 
 
In light of the five explanations as examined above, it can be concluded that the choice 
and application of review standards should not be made solely on the basis of any of the 
explanations in a vacuum, for instance on the basis on whether the issue at hand concerns 
a negative or positive duty (although this consideration is arguably the most dominant), 
but rather on the basis of all relevant factors assessed as a whole. The next chapter in turn 
will examine the available standards of review to the Committee, and the rationale behind 
its choice of review. 
 
 
4.4. The adjudication of individual complaints under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR 
 
4.4.1. Reasonableness review 
 
In contrast to the other complaints procedures of the core human rights treaties within the 
United Nations system, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is provided with an express 
standard of review. It is provided by article 8 (4) and frequently referred to as ‘the 
reasonableness review’. Article 8(4) reads as follows: 
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When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the 
reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. 
In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible 
policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant. 
 
 
In accordance with article 8(4), the Committee will thus assess the reasonableness of the 
steps taken by states (both forwards and back) to fulfil their Covenant obligations, which 
may be achieved by a number of ‘policy measures’. The Committee must moreover 
interpret reasonableness in accordance with the general obligations of the Covenant, 
which it has indicated to do on the basis of its previous practice under the periodic state 
reporting process.294 Importantly, when considering reasonableness, the Committee will 
not inquire whether other more favourable measures could have been adopted, but 
whether the measures in fact adopted are reasonable. States may thus meet their 
obligations through a range of possible measures. 
 
 
The inclusion of an express standard of review, in its present wording, reflected the 
discomfort of some states concerning the adjudication of socioeconomic rights. Such 
discomfort was particularly related to the extent to which their budgetary choices would 
come under the Committee’s scrutiny, and whether such scrutiny could lead to costly 
remedies.295 Indeed, the drafting history of the Optional Protocol shows that the wording 
of article 8(4) was a result of heated debates, e.g. relating to the justiciability of positive 
obligations, the possibility of a so-called á la carte approach allowing states to choose 
the rights that would be made justiciable, as well as efforts to include an explicit margin 
of appreciation.296 Ultimately, the efforts to undermine the effectiveness of the Optional 
Protocol were defeated by the compromise language of article 8(4), drawn almost 
verbatim from the approach taken by the SACC in Grootboom, arguably the most famous 
socioeconomic rights case adjudicated through reasonableness review by a national 
court.297 
 
 
 
 
 
294 CECSR, 2007 statement, para. 2. 
295 On the drafting history of article 8(4), see Porter 2014, pp. 5-16, and Griffey 2011 pp. 291-304. 
296 See generally, Porter 2014, Griffey 2011. 
297   CCSA,  Grootboom  and  Others  v.  the  Government of the  Republic  of South  Africa  and  Others 
(Grootboom), judgement of 4 October 2000, CCT 11/00, para. 41. 
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The Committee applied the reasonableness standard in its first consideration of a 
communication on the merits under the Optional Protocol, I.D.G v. Spain.298  In it, the 
Committee considered whether the author’s right to adequate housing had been violated 
as a consequence of a mortgage enforcement process against her, allegedly since she had 
not been properly notified, and thus prevented from defending her housing rights under 
the Covenant. Indeed, the Committee noted that although attempts had been made to 
notify the claimant at her home, other measures had not been taken, such as leaving a 
note at her mailbox or with the caretaker.299 The Committee thus concluded that the State 
Party had not taken all reasonable measures to adequately notify the claimant, and 
consequently, had prevented her from a proper defence.300  Accordingly, by failing to 
fulfil the obligation of providing the author with an effective remedy, the State Party had 
violated the rights of the claimant under article 11(1) in conjunction with article 2(1).301 
 
While the decision is significant in being the first communication considered under the 
Optional Protocol, and in highlighting the importance of procedural safeguards in terms 
of access to an effective remedy, it did little to reveal how the Committee would purport 
to consider reasonableness. Examining a more substantive description of the scope of the 
reasonableness review, found in a 2007 statement by the Committee, may thus be helpful. 
The statement was adopted during the negotiations of the Optional Protocol in order to 
“clarify how it might consider State parties’ obligations under article 2(1) in the context 
of an individual communications procedure”.302 It included the following list of factors 
that it would potentially consider when assessing reasonableness: 
 
(a) the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete, and targeted towards 
the fulfilment of economic, social, and cultural rights; (b) whether the State party exercised 
its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner; (c) whether the State 
party’s decision (not) to allocate available resources is in accordance with international 
human rights standards; (d) where several policy options are available, whether the State 
party adopts the option that least restricts Covenant rights; (e) the time frame in which the 
steps were taken; (f) whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of 
 
 
 
298 CESCR, I.D.G v. Spain, adoption of views 17 June 2015, Communication No. 2/2014. 
299 Ibid., para. 13.2-3. 
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disadvantaged  and  marginalized  individuals  or  groups  and,  whether  they  were  non- 
discriminatory, and whether they prioritized grave situations or situations of risk. 
 
The factors demonstrate considerable similarities between the approach of the Committee 
and the approach taken by the CCSA in Grootboom. Particular by stressing the 
prioritization of marginalized individuals or groups (f), the Committee echoed the 
language of the CCSA according to which “[t]hose whose needs are most urgent and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights is therefore most in peril, must not be ignored by the 
measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right”.303 While the Committee is no way 
bound by the interpretation and application of reasonableness by the CCSA, no less 
should it ignore that the wording of the reasonableness standard in article 8(4), ultimately 
adopted as a compromise result, was strongly influenced by article 41 of the judgment. 
Arguably therefore, the approach of the CCSA, at least when it comes to Grootboom, 
should be given some value in interpreting how the reasonableness standard should be 
applied. 
 
The relevance of the Grooboom decision for the application of the reasonableness review 
under the Optional Protocol may be narrowed down to two main considerations. On the 
one hand, the reasonableness standard of Grootboom is argued to be based upon the 
foundational value of human dignity.304 Notably, the CCSA stressed the commitment to 
“transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and 
equality…”.305 Accordingly, the court thus emphasized the transformative purpose of 
socioeconomic rights.306 In light of the above, it has been argued that the Optional 
Protocol, in drawing considerate inspiration from the Grootboom decision, would 
similarly be characterized of a transformative object and purpose.307  This would 
moreover  be  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  Committee,  similar  to  the  CCSA  in 
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Grootboom, has highlighted the importance of prioritizing the needs of the 
marginalized.308 
 
On the other hand, the Grootboom decision emphasized that reasonableness should be 
determined against the historical, economic and social context against which the claim 
arises.309  As stated by Liebenberg, courts are enabled to adapt the stringency of their 
review standard “informed by factors such as the position of the claimant group in society, 
the nature of the resource or service claimed and the impact of the denial of access to the 
service or resource in question on the claimant group”.310 Read together, the 
reasonableness standard contained in article 8 (4) of the Optional Protocol should 
therefore be understood as both context-sensitive and flexible, while simultaneously 
shaped by considerations of human dignity. 
 
The decision was moreover notable by its rejection of a “stand-alone” minimum core 
approach. Such an approach would have established an obligation for states to provide 
for a minimum threshold of socioeconomic rights, a standard which, as noted earlier, has 
been treated inconsistently by the Committee.311 The CCSA did not, however, rule out 
the possibility of allowing the minimum core standard to guide its future application of 
the reasonableness review.312 As noted by Young, the emphasize of the reasonableness 
review on the needs of the those in most dire need would seem to reflect the same focus 
on priority-setting as the minimum core approach, while simultaneously respecting the 
mandate of the other state branches.313 Of this follows, that it might be advisable for the 
Committee to de-emphasize the role of the minimum core approach, while holding open 
the possibility of letting it guide its assessment of the reasonableness of steps taken, when 
deciding complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
 
4.4.2. Proportionality analysis 
 
Alongside reasonableness review, proportionality analysis represents the other major 
review  standard  for  evaluating  state  compliance.  It is  often  described  as  the  most 
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disciplined and structured standard for rights adjudication and enforcement.314 A common 
feature of both standards is the rejection of more absolutist standards, such as the 
minimum core.315 Despite the apparent advantages of the proportionality analysis, it has 
rarely been applied in relation to the adjudication of socioeconomic rights. 316  It is 
moreover unclear how the two standards, reasonableness and proportionality, relate to 
one another. As a consequence of the Optional Protocol, setting the applicable standard 
of the Committee to that of reasonableness, the question has become all the more 
pertinent. Thus, in order to understand how the Committee should approach when 
reviewing complaints concerning non-retrogression, one must first examine the question 
of proportionality. 
 
 
Along the formulation of leading theorists on proportionality, the proportionality analysis 
is composed of the following questions.317  First, did the interfering measure pursue a 
legitimate aim? Second, was there a rational connection between the measure and the 
achievement of the aim, in other words, was the policy suitable? Third, was the measure 
necessary in the sense that there did not exist less intrusive but equally effective 
alternative means? The most rigorous formulation of the test deems necessary an 
infringement only if there are no alternative, less restrictive means available. Fourth, are 
the costs imposed by the infringement on the rights-holder outweighed by the overall 
benefits of the measure? It is this final balancing stage, proportionality in the strict sense, 
or, the proportionality principle, that is at the heart of proportionality analysis.318 
 
 
Indeed, it has been argued that while the structured test of the proportionality analysis 
might not have found its way into social rights adjudication, in contrast, the principle of 
proportionality may be understood as a subset of reasonableness.319 As noted by Young 
“[t]he reasonableness standard, which directs attention to the gravity of the need, and the 
vulnerability of the rights-holder, makes proportionality – as principle, but not as a 
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structured test – inseparable from reasonableness review.”320 In contrast, the 
proportionality analysis is mainly applied in regard of civil and political rights in their 
vertical dimension, i.e. between the state and private entities, in cases involving negative 
obligations.321 
 
 
Möller argues that the asymmetrical application of the proportionality analysis in benefit 
of civil and political rights is explained by the fact that it would not make sense in relation 
to socioeconomic rights and positive obligations, since they require scarce resources for 
their realization. Thus, he argues, “any limitation [of socioeconomic rights] will always 
further the legitimate goal of saving resources and will always be suitable and necessary 
to the achievement of that goal.”322 According to him, the only meaningful inquiry would 
therefore be the final balancing stage in terms of the proportionality principle.323 It should 
nevertheless be noted that article 4 of the ICECSR allows limitations solely for the 
purpose of promoting general welfare, which does not necessarily have to be identical 
with the goal of “saving resources”. Moreover, reducing the benefits enjoyed by 
marginalized groups of society, for instance, in order to save resources, would generally 
not be considered necessary in the sense that there would not have been less restrictive 
means available, in order to achieve whatever aim that is argued to promote general 
welfare in the particular case. 
 
 
It is nevertheless notable that the SSCA has refrained from adhering “mechanically to a 
sequential check-list” when applying proportionality under the limitations clause.324  In 
relation to the necessity stage, for instance, the court has stated that when considering 
whether ‘less restrictive means’ would have been available, it shall not limit the 
government’s range of legitimate legislative choice in a specific area.325 By echoing the 
language of reasonableness, the court recognizes that such choices are influenced by inter 
alia, considerations of cost, priorities of social demand and conflicting interests.326  As 
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discussed earlier in relation to the factors affecting the choice of review standards, the 
CCSA nevertheless applied the multi-pronged proportionality analysis in Jaftha, 
concerning the failure by the state to respect its negative obligations. The same approach 
is adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has applied a ‘fair- 
balance’ test in relation to the assessment of positive obligations, whereas the 
proportionality analysis has been reserved for the assessment of negative obligations.327 
 
 
Prior to analysing the adjudication of retrogression-related complaints by the Committee 
in the final chapter of this thesis, it is helpful to first examine the relationship between 
reasonableness and proportionality, by way of a brief comparative exercise. 
 
 
4.4.3. Reasonableness review and proportionality analysis: a comparison 
 
Through their ability of balancing, albeit by differing methodologies, reasonableness 
review and proportionality analysis are both celebrated standards; reasonableness for its 
sensitivity for the contextual setting and considerations of human dignity, proportionality 
for its disciplined and sequenced structure. Their respective strengths may nevertheless 
constitute their greatest weaknesses – in a way, therefore, the two standards may be 
illustrated as opposites. 
 
 
The first difference relates to the content of the right under adjudication; in 
proportionality, the claimant bears the burden of proving that an infringement has taken 
place, after which the burden of justification shifts to the state. In reasonableness, 
however, the two steps are integrated in a single context-driven inquiry. It has thus been 
argued to focus disproportionately on the justification of the state in relation to the impact 
of the deprivation of the right on the claimant, and thus to operate in “a normative 
vacuum”.328   In Mazibuko, for instance, the CCSA refused to consider the question of a 
minimum monthly quota of water, although the existing quota (8 kilolitres) was clearly 
insufficient.329  A proportionality analysis, including an inquiry into whether less 
restrictive measures could have been adopted to achieve the aim of the state, inter alia, 
 
 
 
 
327 See generally, Mowbray, 2010. 
328 Liebenberg 2010, pp. 175-176. 
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the rehabilitation of the water network, might perhaps have changed the outcome of the 
case.330 
 
 
The second and third differences relate to their structure, and approach to deference. 
Whereas the structure of proportionality analysis is generally formed by the four-step 
inquiry as described above, reasonableness review proceeds through a more holistic 
inquiry. While it may inquire into the same questions as proportionality analysis, it does 
so in a more ad hoc, than structured manner. Arguably, therefore, proportionality requires 
a more stringent justification by the state. Here lies the underlying factor to their differing 
approaches to deference: in reasonableness review, deference is seen as integrated in the 
one-part-inquiry, interpreted generously in relation to the state, as noted above. In 
proportionality analysis, however, the structured inquiry (inter alia whether the state 
could have adopted less restrictive means, or more rigorously even, whether it adopted 
the least restrictive means) may pose a risk of judicial usurpation, thus constituting a 
problem of separation of powers.331 Accordingly, proportionality analysis, particularly in 
relation to positive obligations, may trigger a self-restraint in the form of deference on 
part of the court. As noted by Young “the general posture of deference, or margin of 
appreciation, immediately defeats the rigor (and consistency) of the inquiry in the first 
place”.332 
 
 
Addressing the relative weakness of the reasonableness review, and the risk of judicial 
abdication of the proportionality analysis, a compromise-solution has been presented: the 
proportionality-inflected reasonableness.333 Indeed, it has been argued that this approach 
would have been adopted by the Committee, by way of its Grootboom inspired 
reasonableness standard as set in article 8 (4) of the Optional Protocol. The compromise- 
standard is, by and large, argued to be applicable in reviewing alleged violations of 
positive obligations. As noted earlier, however, retrogression-related complaints mainly 
implicate negative obligations in the form of active state interferences. Accordingly, 
while the standard of proportionality-inflected reasonableness might be helpful in finding 
 
 
 
330 Young 2017, pp. 22, 29. 
331 Contiades & Fotiadou, 2012, p. 668. 
332 Young 2017, p. 25. 
333 Ibid., pp. 30-33. 
62  
 
the key to the adjudication of retrogression-related complaints, it may only be a partial 
solution. 
 
 
In light of the above, the purpose of the final chapter is to examine the way in which the 
Committee should purport to interpret and apply the reasonableness standard of article 8 
(4), and whether it should opt for a hybrid standard of review, as suggested by some 
commentators. In order to answer these, and related questions, it is necessary to first 
examine the relationship between such measures and formal limitations, in order to 
determine whether they could be considered in light of a unified approach. 
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5. The adjudication of retrogression-related complaints under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
 
 
5.1. The relationship between retrogressive measures and limitations: an inquiry 
While seemingly straightforward, the relationship between retrogressive measures and 
formal limitations is largely unresolved. In determining whether the general limitations 
clause would enable the consideration of all types of alleged violations in the form of 
active infringements (including retrogressive measures), it must be interpreted “in good 
faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.334 In the absence of deliberation 
by the Committee, and as a supplementary means of interpretation, the ICESCR’s drafting 
history and relevant scholarly work concerning the limitations clause and the scope of its 
application vis-à-vis article 2 (1), are examined to the following.335 
 
 
Most notably, the travaux préparatoires elaborate on the question of scarce resources. 
Motivated by the fact that nonfulfillment on the basis of scarce resources was seen as a 
matter falling under article 2 (1), the travaux indicate, that the drafters did not allow the 
possibility to justify limitations in terms of article 4 based on insufficient available 
resources.336 Instead, in line with other human rights treaties, limitations were regarded 
as necessary in order to balance the rights of the individual with the interests of the 
community, as well as to solve situations were two rights conflict with each other. A 
noteworthy passage from the travaux reveal the reasoning behind representatives that 
favoured the inclusion of a general limitations clause: 
 
…the provisions of Article 2 should relate only to the general level of attainment of rights and 
should not be invoked by States as grounds for imposing numerous limitations on them. Article 
2 did not indicate when limitations could be legitimate, and it was necessary to state clearly that 
limitations would be permissible only in certain circumstances and under certain conditions337 
 
 
 
 
 
334 VCLT, general rule of interpretation, art. 31. 
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The above statement may prove significant for the clarification of the relationship 
between article 2 (1) and 4. It has namely been understood to imply a distinction between 
limitations in terms of article 4 on the one hand, and a “general level of attainment” of 
rights, conditioned by the availability of resources, on the other. From such an assumption 
follows, that a resource-motivated reduction in the attainment of ESC rights would not 
seem to constitute a limitation in the sense of article 4.338 Accordingly, a reduction in the 
enjoyment of ESC rights, or, a retrogressive measure, would not be synonymous to a 
formal limitation, and would thus not have to be justified in accordance with the general 
limitations clause. Given that the Committee has developed its doctrine on non- 
retrogression since 1991,339 and continuously referred to it in both general comments and 
formal statements since, it would seem appropriate to assume that the Committee does in 
fact consider the two notions as separate, although it has yet failed to address their 
relationship. Indeed, according to some commentators, the above view would be shared 
by the Committee.340 
 
 
In contrast to the view of the drafters, however, and presumably the Committee, some 
commentators insist that no distinction be made between retrogressive measures on the 
one hand and limitations stricto sencu on the other. Leckie, for instance, argues that a 
retrogressive measure, like any other active interference of the Covenant rights, would 
constitute a limitation, and thus a violation, if not duly justified with regard to the 
safeguards set forth by article 4.341 Müller has similarly argued for the application of a 
single standard for the evaluation of all restrictions of ESC rights, whether retrogressive 
measures on the basis of insufficient resources, or limitations other than those relating to 
resource availability.342 Additionally, Alston and Quinn note that the limitations clause 
was also intended for situations in which “the exigencies of state-administered 
socioeconomic welfare programs might necessitate limitations on the provision of 
benefits or other entitlements”.343 Due to the unclear reason why public welfare programs 
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would necessitate limitations, if not as a consequence of limited available resources (in 
which case the drafters purported limitations to be assessed under article 2(1)), this 
understanding of the purpose of article 4 would seem to support the application of single 
standard for assessing both types of active interferences of the Covenant rights. 
 
 
Essentially, a unified standard is believed to be beneficial in order for states not to be able 
to circumvent their obligations by relying on a competing, weaker standard. By enjoying 
wider discretion in terms of article 2 (1) vis-á-vis article 4, they might attempt to avoid 
their obligations under article 4, instead invoking scarce resources under article 2 (1). 
Accordingly, it is not difficult to imagine situations where states would rely on the notion 
of progressive realization, in order to justify “any limitations on a de facto rather than de 
jure basis”.344 For instance, whereas a state would not be allowed under article 4 to 
allocate resources from Covenant related areas to an increased defence expenditure 
(without the burden of proving that this would be tantamount to promoting general 
welfare),345 under article 2 (1), resource constraints as a consequence of an armed conflict 
might be regarded as a legitimate justification for the adoption of retrogressive measures. 
Indeed, in light of the Committee’s 2007 statement, “serious claims on the State party’s 
limited resources” might be held to justify retrogression, for instance when resulting from 
an armed conflict, natural disaster or a period of economic recession.346 
 
 
The advocates of a unified approach are moreover motivated by the establishment of a 
clearer contextual relationship between article 2 (1) and 4.347 This is supported by the fact 
that limitations in the form of active interferences with the obligation to respect, share 
significant similarities with the obligation not to take retrogressive measures. The two 
concepts appear to differ only in situations where a retrogressive measure does not 
constitute an active step back in existing levels of access to socioeconomic rights, but 
rather when a state omits to maintain current levels of rights enjoyment.348 This might for 
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instance occur when a states fails to allocate additional resources in order to maintain 
existing levels of access to social security benefits, in the context of inflation.349 As noted 
by O’Conell et al.: 
 
 
“we conclude that the difference between the obligation to respect and the obligation not to take 
retrogressive measures essentially relates to the situation where a step backwards by the state 
(retrogression) does not interfere with the current enjoyment of the right (the obligation to respect). 
For example, a promise of funding that is subsequently withdrawn before it was actually allocated 
may constitute a retrogressive measure, but not a violation of the obligation to respect”350 
 
 
Since the majority of retrogression-related complaints concern active state interferences, 
it would appear logical that the Committee should assess such complaints by applying the 
multi-sequenced proportionality analysis as provided for by the limitations clause.351 As 
noted earlier, however, determining the applicable standard of review solely based on the 
legal nature of the relevant obligation might not always be fully rational. The often- 
misperceived conception of negative obligations being less financially restraining upon 
the state, might moreover disproportionately tip the scale in favour of applying the 
proportionality analysis. The adjudication of socioeconomic rights claims mainly through 
reasonableness review – particularly by the Committee, bound to do so under article 8 (4) 
of the Optional Protocol – would, of course, point to the contrary. It would moreover 
seem fair to say that most cases involving retrogression, for instance budgetary cuts in 
relation to social benefits or services, such as basic health care or primary education, do 
not constitute borderline cases, but clear interferences with the obligation to respect. 
 
Some aspects of the unified approach might nevertheless give rise to concern. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, muscular standards for evaluating the compatibility of 
retrogressive measures might impede the ability of states to reallocate resources from 
those who are relatively well-off to those in need, particularly in times of severe resource 
constraints. Assessing retrogression-related complaints under article 4 might give rise to 
similar problems. Indeed, as noted in chapter two, it is generally understood that article 4 
should be interpreted in restrictive terms. Moreover, it allows limitations to be justified 
 
 
349 Nohlan & Dutschke, 2010, p. 5. 
350 O’Connell et al., 2014, p. 92 
351 ICESCR, article 4. See further chapter 4.4.2. 
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solely for the benefit of promoting ‘general welfare’. As will be argued below, however, 
the general limitations clause might not be as restrictive as often perceived. In this regard, 
the notion of general welfare is worth further consideration. 
 
The phrase is elaborated upon by the Limburg principles, according to which it shall be 
understood to mean “furthering the well-being of the people as a whole”.352 The question 
is therefore, how ‘well-being’ should be understood? Some guidance may be drawn from 
research made in relation to article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), upon which article 4 of the ICESCR is based.353 In the context of the UDHR, 
general welfare has been understood as referring to the “economic and social well-being 
of the community”,354 the purpose of which seems to be promoting the “dignity and well- 
being” of the individual.355 Read together with the interpretation of the Limburg 
principles, general welfare might thus be understood to justify limitations for the purposes 
of furthering the socioeconomic well-being and dignity of the population as a whole. 
When construed in broad terms as per above, the requirement of ‘general welfare’ would 
arguably not pose an overly rigorous burden upon states seeking to justify retrogressive 
measures under the general limitations clause in order to, for instance, redirect resources 
for the protection of individuals or groups in more need. 
 
As has been examined above, the differences between retrogressive measures and 
limitations are arguably slight. States are thus likely to frame their (in)action so as to fall 
under the more lenient standard applied in relation to article 2(1), whereby article 4 risks 
losing its “teeth”. It would moreover appear practically impossible for the Committee to 
clearly distinguish between retrogressive measures taken as a consequence of scarce 
resources on the one hand, and limitations on the basis of other grounds (linked to the 
requirement of ‘general welfare’) on the other.356 It would thereby seem logical to 
abandon the distinction made between retrogressive measures and formal limitations, and 
 
 
 
352 Limburg principles, principle 52. 
353 Alston & Quinn, 1987, p. 198. 
354 The Individuals Duties to the Community and the Limitations of Human Rights and Freedoms under 
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, prepared by Special Rapporteur of the Sub- 
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Erica-Irene Daes, 1983, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, at 1018. 
355 Ibid., at 250. 
356 Müller, 2009, p. 585. 
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to instead review all active infringements of the Covenant rights in light of the criteria set 
forth by the general limitations clause. 
 
 
Equating retrogressive measures with limitations, and reviewing them under a unified 
standard would, however, entail de-emphasizing the doctrine on non-retrogression in the 
context of the individual complaints procedure. While arguments have been forwarded to 
this effect,357 it would admittedly be problematic by countering the praxis of the 
Committee, developed since the adoption of General Comment No. 3 in 1990. It is thus 
worth examining whether such a “reform” could in fact be supported in terms of the object 
and purpose of the Optional Protocol. 
 
 
5.2. The concept of non-retrogression and the individual and collective dimensions 
of socioeconomic rights enforcement 
 
In determining whether the concept of non-retrogression is applicable in relation to the 
individual complaints procedure, it is helpful to examine the context in which the standard 
was adopted. As noted earlier, until the entry into force of the Optional Protocol in 2013, 
the Committee only operated through its monitoring mechanism in the context of state 
reporting processes. The standards of progressive realization and non-retrogression were 
therefore adopted primarily for purposes of monitoring, rather than adjudication. As 
examined below, this simple observation might have far-reaching consequences for the 
future adjudication of retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
Melish, for instance, argues that the standards of progressivity/non-retrogression should 
be abandoned in individual complaints procedures. She notes that: 
 
 
These concepts, as measures of results-based achievement over the sum of the population, are 
inappropriate as juridical standards in individual contentious processes, particularly at the 
supranational level, where justiciability requirements such as causation and demonstrable injury 
to duly-identified persons are key.358 
 
 
The above critique may be boiled down to two main arguments. The first one relates to 
 
the Committee’s varying application of the state obligations flowing from the ICESCR 
 
 
 
357 See e.g., Landau 2012, p. 240, Melish 2005, p. 63, Dowell-Jones 2004, pp. 52-54. 
358 Melish, 2005, p. 52. 
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depending on the enforcement mechanisms it is operating through. Indeed, when issuing 
views on individual complaints in its capacity as quasi-judicial organ (i.e., the individual 
dimension of socioeconomic rights enforcement), the Committee is argued to apply the 
tripartite typology of the obligations respect, protect and fulfil. By contrast, in relation to 
periodic state reporting processes in its capacity as a monitoring organ (i.e., the collective 
dimension), it is instead argued to apply the concept of progressive realization.359 This 
individual/collective dichotomy suggests that states have both obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil the rights of particular individuals and groups of individuals, as well as 
broader obligations to progressively ensure a greater access to the Covenant rights in 
respect of the entire population.360  State Parties are thus required to adopt reasonable 
public policies, and to make sure that any retrogressive measures in this respect are duly 
justified. Most notably, any such overall retrogression would be assessed by way of the 
collective standards of progressive realization/non-retrogression. 
 
 
Applying collective standards in relation to individual contentious processes would, 
however, seem to nullify the very concept of progressive realization. Indeed, it would 
appear to expose the Committee to situations where a particular individual or group of 
individuals would argue that retrogressive measures adopted by the state amounts to a 
violation of the obligation to progressive realize the relevant rights. This, even if such 
measures were adopted to achieve general progress with regard to the entire population, 
or indeed for the protection of the rights of particularly disadvantaged groups of society. 
Applying the concept of non-retrogression to individual complaints would, therefore, risk 
entrenching the status quo – in the name of human rights. Such an interpretation would 
arguably obscure what is argued to be the over-riding interpretative framework of the 
Optional Protocol, i.e. the transformative dimension of the reasonableness standard in 
article 8(4).361 
 
 
 
 
 
 
359 Melish, 2005, pp. 61-62. 
360 Arguably, adopted one year prior to the Optional Protocol, the 2012-letter constitutes the most 
comprehensive description of how such an assessment would take shape. As noted earlier, however, the 
Committee may nevertheless draw guidance from it, and other instruments adopted primarily for 
monitoring purposes, when adjudicating complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
361 Porter, 2014, p. 29. 
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The second argument relates to the division of the Covenant obligations into obligations 
of conduct and obligations of result. As noted in chapter two, the former obliges states to 
undertake certain measures in pursuit of a given result, whereas the latter obliges states 
to achieve a certain outcome, irrespective of the form of conduct. While both dimensions 
are mutually inclusive and apply to all human rights, it has nevertheless been purported 
that only the latter would be directly justiciable in relation to individual complaints filed 
under the Optional Protocol.362 This is argued to follow from the fact that assessing state 
conduct in individual contentious processes requires evidence over the existence of three 
elements: a causal link between the concrete injury suffered by the complainant and the 
conduct of the state by way of an act or an omission. Indeed, except for rare provisions 
obliging states to take certain measures (in particular the imperative yet vague obligation 
of ‘taking steps’ towards the full realization of Covenant rights), the Covenant does not 
impose specific obligations of conduct.363 Due to the inability of the concept of 
progressive realization to prove causation, it has been argued to be non-justiciable in 
terms of individual complaints under the Optional Protocol.364 
 
 
Of the above follows that while the concept of non-retrogression is, and should be, applied 
in relation to periodic state reporting processes, it would be advisable to de-emphasize it 
when assessing retrogressive measures in relation to individual claims. De-emphasizing 
the concept of non-retrogression would similarly be supported by several factors 
discussed in earlier chapters, particularly in relation to distributive justice. Instead, the 
Committee should focus on the tripartite typology, and assess the compatibility of 
retrogressive measures in light of the criteria set by article 4. With that said, the limitations 
clause must not be interpreted and applied so as to obscure the well-being and dignity of 
the rights-holder vis-á-vis the sum of the population. In the following sub-chapter, I will 
therefore re-examine the standards of review as available to the Committee, in order to 
find the optional balance for the adjudicating of retrogression-related complaints under 
the Optional Protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
362 Melish, 2005, p. 64. 
363 De Schutter, 2019, p. 566. 
364 Melish, 2005, p. 64. 
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5.3. Reasonableness-inflected proportionality 
 
While it has been argued that the Committee should review all active interferences of the 
Covenant rights under the proportionality analysis (through the general limitations 
clause), it must do so while simultaneously considering the reasonableness of the steps 
taken, as conditioned by article 8 (4) of the Optional Protocol. As noted earlier, some 
commentators advocate for the application of a proportionality-inflected reasonableness, 
when considering complaints involving positive obligations.365 The proportionality- 
inflected reasonableness, or alternatively the “pure” reasonableness review, would thus 
appear applicable whenever a retrogressive-related complaint involves an alleged failure 
by the state to take positive action in order to maintain existing levels of access to the 
Covenant rights.366 As discussed earlier, however, the majority of complaints involving 
retrogressive measures concern situations in which the state has, in fact, actively 
interfered with the relevant rights. Against this background, it will be suggested that 
retrogression-related  complaints  should  generally  be  reviewed  under  a  standard  of 
‘reasonableness-inflected proportionality’. 
 
 
 
In light of the reasonableness-inflected proportionality, the Committee should apply the 
four-step inquiry into the aims, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict 
sense, as a basis for assessing (active) retrogression-related complaints under the Optional 
Protocol. Indeed, reflecting the step of necessity, the Committee has stated that it will 
consider “whether the State party adopts the option that least restricts the Covenant 
rights” when determining the reasonableness of the steps taken. 367 Importantly, however, 
the wording of article 8 (4) allows states to adopt “a range of possible policy measures” 
in order to implement the Covenant rights. Of this follows, that the Committee should 
generally not inquire into whether other more favorable measures could have been 
adopted, or whether public resources could have been better allocated; rather, it should 
determine whether the adopted measures were, in fact, reasonable.368 Requiring states to 
have adopted the least restrictive alternative in order the be compliant with the Covenant, 
would therefore appear inconsistent with the above. 
 
365 See further, chapter 4.4.3. 
366 It would not appear to be meaningful to review state inaction in light of article 4, for instance, since it 
would generally not pass the initial test of “determined by law”. 
367 CESCR, 2007 statement, para. 3. 
368 See, CCSA, Grootboom, para. 41. 
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Allowing states to choose between a range of alternatives does not, however, entail a 
carte blanche for states to arbitrarily choose whatever measure they deem fit.369 As 
consistently noted by the Committee, the margin of discretion enjoyed by states in 
assessing the most feasible measure to implement the relevant rights, should not be 
interpreted as a pretext for non-compliance.370 Article 8 (4) thus allows states to choose 
between a range of policy measures in compliance with the Covenant.371  In assessing 
whether an active interference is, indeed, compliant, and thereby reasonable, the 
Committee would arguably have to consider whether less restrictive, albeit equally 
effective means, would have been available to ensure the Covenant rights. Moreover, 
since the Committee would not have to consider questions of resource allocation 
(compared to if it were to assess complaints involving state inaction), such an inquiry 
would not appear to constitute an issue from the viewpoint of the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
 
 
The important question to be answered is, therefore, how reasonableness should be read 
in within the proportionality analysis? Again, the circumstances under which article 8(4) 
was adopted, notably influenced by the Grootboom decision, should inform the 
interpretation and application of the reasonableness review. Indeed, notions of human 
dignity and context-sensitivity should play a key role, thus allowing to factor in 
considerations such as the claimant’s position in society and the impact of the deprivation 
on the claimant.372 Such considerations should inform the Committee’s assessment of the 
first prong of the final stage of proportionality analysis (proportionality in the strict 
sense), i.e. the infringement on the rights holder, when aiming to strike a fair balance 
between the interests of the claimant and the state. If the claimant belongs to more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
369 The determination of whether appropriate measures have been adopted shall ultimately be made by the 
Committee, see, CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para 4. 
370 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 21; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 53; CESCR, 
General Comment No. 15, para. 45; CESCR, General Comment No. 16 para. 32; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 17, para. 47, CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 37; CESCR, General Comment 19, 
para. 66. 
371 Griffey, 2011, p. 290. 
372 See further, chapter 4.4.1. 
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advantageous groups of society, it may be assumed that, ceteris paribus, the infringement 
is relatively less constraining than it would be on a person belonging to “the margins”.373 
 
 
The assessment of the other prong of the proportionality in the strict sense, i.e. the overall 
benefits of the measure, will similarly have to be made in light of the context. As noted 
earlier, limitations may be justified solely for the purpose of general welfare, argued in 
this thesis to conform with the socioeconomic well-being and dignity of the people as a 
whole. Accordingly, if retrogression is resorted to as a necessary measure for the purpose 
of achieving general welfare in terms of the definition above, proportionality in the strict 
sense should be given an interpretation generous to the government. This would for 
instance be the case in the context of increasing access of a right to both a larger number 
and a wider range of people.374 Indeed, when assessing the reasonableness of the steps 
taken (backwards) within the proportionality analysis, the Committee would need to 
factor in not only the impact of the infringement on the rights-holder, but also any 
increasing coverage and reducing inequalities in the access of the right under assessment, 
in relation to the population as a whole.375 
 
 
With that said, assessing the reasonableness of any retrogressive steps would arguably 
have to be made in relation to particular individuals, or group of individuals, rather than 
in relation to the population in its entirety. As discussed in chapter 3.4, any interpretation 
to the contrary would obscure the equal protection of human rights towards everyone, 
irrespective of social background. In other words, the state is obliged to justify any 
retrogression taken in relation to a particular claimant, even when an increased overall 
enjoyment is demonstrable. While an increasing coverage should not affect the standing 
of a claimant, it should certainly be factored in at the merits stage. 
 
 
The concerns related to proportionality analysis, discussed in chapter 4, are also worth 
addressing. As noted earlier, the proportionality analysis is feared to cause self-restraint 
on part of courts, particularly when applied in relation to socioeconomic rights. This 
 
 
 
373 See statement by Justice Louise Arbor ‘Freedom from Want – From Charity to Entitlement’, La 
Fontaine-Baldwin Lecture, 2005. See further, chapter 4.2. 
374 SACC, Grootboom, para. 45. 
375 Melish, 2005, p. 63. 
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would not, however, seem to materialize in relation to the adjudication of retrogression- 
related complaints; indeed, by mainly implicating the obligation to respect (in its negative 
dimension), the enforcement retrogression-related complaints will generally be perceived 
as less encroaching upon the powers of the elected branches, compared to complaints 
involving obligations to protect or fulfil. Of this follows, that the application of the 
proportionality analysis would generally not lead to deference on part of the Committee, 
particularly when inflected with the more context-sensitive standard of reasonableness. 
 
 
Finally, provided that the complaint passes the prior stages of the proportionality analysis, 
the Committee would need to consider whether the overall benefits outweigh the impact 
on the rights-holder, influenced by considerations as per above. Lying at the heart of 
reasonableness, the needs of the disadvantaged must be accorded special attention. In the 
context of social reforms, the Committee should thus accord due weight to the overall 
progress made by the State Party in relation to socioeconomic rights protection, 
particularly when achieved in respect to marginalized groups. The reasonableness- 
inflected proportionality analysis may thus provide the key for a more socially just 
adjudication of retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The present thesis has examined the adjudicating of retrogression-related complaints 
under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. This, since the question of how such 
complaints should be assessed by the Committee in the light of the reasonableness 
standard as set in article 8 (4) of the Optional Protocol has received only little attention. 
It was noted that although the ICESCR includes a general limitations clause in article 4, 
the Committee has rarely applied it in practice; instead, it has appeared to develop a 
doctrine on non-retrogression in the light of which ‘retrogressive measures’ are assessed. 
Attention was moreover drawn to the unclear normative content of the concept of non- 
retrogression, and the unestablished relationship between retrogressive measures and 
formal limitations, whereby the adjudication of socioeconomic rights has been rendered 
challenging. Accordingly, this thesis has sought to answer these, and related questions, in 
order to provide the Committee with a model for adjudicating retrogression-related 
complaints under the Optional Protocol 
 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I have sought to clarify the content and scope of the 
state obligations stemming from the Covenant. As such, I have first examined the nature 
of said obligations in the light of three categorizations: negative and positive obligations, 
obligations of respect, protect and fulfil, and obligations of conduct and result. An 
overview of the main obligations-related provisions of the Covenant was moreover 
provided, in the context of which it was noted that the concept of non-retrogression may 
be viewed as the natural corollary to the concept of progressive realization. Accordingly, 
by undertaking to progressively realize the Covenant rights, states simultaneously 
undertake not to reduce already achieved levels of access to them. While the Committee 
has regrettably failed to clarify the actual meaning of a ‘retrogressive measure’, it has 
been defined by Sepúlveda as “any measure that implies a step back in the level of 
protection accorded to the rights contained in the Covenant which is the consequence of 
an intentional decision by the State”.376 It was noted that while the majority of 
retrogression-related complaints concern active state interferences, they may also involve 
a failure by the state to take positive action in order to maintain existing levels of access 
to rights. 
 
 
376 Sepulveda, 2003, p. 323. 
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In chapter three, it was stressed that the concept of non-retrogression does not impose an 
absolute bar against adopting retrogressive measures. It was nevertheless noted that their 
compatibility will be reviewed under a particularly strong from of scrutiny. Having 
considered the challenges experienced by the Committee in interpreting and applying the 
concept of non-retrogression, I have thus sought to outline the circumstances under which 
retrogressive measures may be considered justifiable. Notably, in its most recent position 
on non-retrogression, the Committee has held that “any policy change or adjustment” 
should be temporary; necessary and proportionate; non-discriminate and, identify and 
protect  the  minimum  core.  The  guiding  effect  of  at  least  some  of  the  criteria 
was, however, considered to be hampered by their ambiguous scope and content. Thus, 
instead of assessing the criteria in a vacuum, it was suggested that they be considered in 
the light of an overall assessment of the reasonableness of the steps taken. 
 
 
In determining the viewpoint from which retrogressive measures should be scrutinized, 
it was suggested that their compatibility should be reviewed in relation to a particular 
individual or group of individuals, rather than in relation to the population as a whole. As 
such, it was noted that an interpretation to the contrary would appear to counter the equal 
protection of human rights to each individual and group, irrespective of socioeconomic 
background. Of this follows, that a State Party would have to justify any retrogression in 
relation to an individual claimant, even in situations where an overall increase in the 
access to socioeconomic rights in respect of the entire population could be demonstrated. 
On the other hand, it was noted that an individual-centred adjudication of retrogression- 
related complaints may be linked to concerns of distributive bias. 
 
 
Indeed, with a particular focus on questions of social justice, in chapter 4, I have examined 
the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Building upon the work of Tushnet, it 
was argued that the protection of socioeconomic rights is generally fostered by relatively 
weak, as opposed to strong forms of standards of review. In particular, it was noted that 
an overly rigid application of the concept of non-retrogression may be viewed as a 
separation of powers issue, potentially compromising the legitimacy of the Committee. It 
was moreover noted that a muscular application of the concept of non-retrogression might 
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lead to a middle-class bias by obstructing the possibilities of states to redistribute 
resources to poorer groups of society. As the Latin American examples suggested, such 
distributive concerns are particularly acute, since judges are more comfortable with the 
enforcement of individual claims, and claims involving negative obligations. This, in 
combination with the fact that advantageous groups of society often reach the courts with 
relative ease, and because such groups have relatively more benefits to cut from in the 
first place. 
 
 
With this in mind, in chapter five I have sought to determine how the Committee should 
purport to adjudicate retrogression-related complaints under the Optional Protocol. First, 
I examined the relationship between retrogressive measures in terms of article 2 (1) and 
limitations in terms of article 4. Notably, the obligation not to take retrogressive measures 
appears to differ from the obligation to respect solely when such measures do not 
constitute active steps backwards in achieved levels of rights enjoyment, but on the 
contrary, when states fail to take necessary measures to maintain existing levels of access 
to them. However, since the majority of retrogressive measures do, in fact, concern active 
interferences, the differences between the two concepts are arguably slight. Accordingly, 
it was suggested that all active interferences, including both formal limitations and 
retrogressive measures, should be reviewed through a unified approach under the criteria 
provided by the general limitations clause. It was suggested that the criteria of “general 
welfare”, contained therein, should be interpreted in broad terms, in order not to pose an 
overly rigorous burden upon stats seeking to justify retrogressive measures on legitimate 
grounds. 
 
 
Second, I examined whether a unified approach could be supported by the purportedly 
transformative purpose of the reasonableness standard in article 8 (4) of the Optional 
Protocol. It was argued that by applying the concepts of progressive realization and non- 
retrogression to individual contentious processes, the Committee would risk turning them 
on their head. Moreover, it was noted that by reflecting result-based obligations over the 
sum of the population, they might not be able to prove causation between the concrete 
injury suffered by the complainant as a consequence of the state conduct. Accordingly, it 
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was suggested that the concept of non-retrogression should be de-emphasized in relation 
to the individual complaints procedure of the Committee. 
 
 
Finally, I have sought to determine a model for the Committee through which it might 
adjudicate individual complaints involving active state interferences. Crucially, it was 
pointed out that the Committee must review all complaints under the reasonableness 
standard as set forth by article 8 (4) of the Optional Protocol. However, since retrogressive 
measures in the form of active interferences greatly resemble formal limitations – and 
because limitations are generally reviewed under the proportionality analysis – it was 
suggested that the two standards be merged, and that active retrogression-related 
complaints be scrutinized through a standard of reasonableness-inflected proportionality. 
The criteria of the limitations clause and the proportionality analysis attached therein 
would thus provide for the basic structure for the assessment of retrogressive measures, 
whereas the compatibility of the steps taken would have to be considered in the light of 
the transformative objective of the reasonableness standard in article 8 (4). This would 
place retrogressive measures under a strong form of scrutiny, while enabling the 
Committee to consider contextual factors such as the claimant’s socioeconomic situation, 
and the impact of the deprivation on him or her. As such, the reasonableness-inflected 
proportionality analysis might thus allow the Committee to deliver an optimal balance 
between the rights of the individual, and the rights of the population as a whole. 
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